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Ross, Ohio Law of Marriage
PART I. INTRODUCTION
Section 1 - Scope and Organization
It is sometimes assumed that Family Law is not the kind of legal area
- like Contracts or Trusts - that can be reduced to a coherent set of
working rules. Among the obstacles cited are the variations between
different states, the lack of agreement as to the scope of the field, the
marked disagreements on the policy underlying much of our family law,
especially the law of divorce and marriage, and the fact that much of our
family law, both in its adoption and its administration, is strongly influ-
enced by nonlegal factors.
TBr AUTHOR (B.S., LL.B., Wisconsin, LL.M., As to the first obstacle,
S.J.D., Michigan) is a Professor of law at state variations, the solution
Western Reserve University and a contributor adopted here is to concentrate
to numerous legal periodicals. Since 1959, Pro-
fessor Ross has served as University Counsel for on Ohio law. Only where there
Western Reserve University. He is a member are no authoritative and recent
of the American, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Cleve- Ohio cases have I gone outside
land Bar Associations.
the state, and then I have tried
to use materials from states
with a domestic relations policy as expressed in the statutes and cases
similar to that of Ohio.
Regarding the second obstacle, disagreement as to the scope of the
area, I have concentrated on a single aspect of domestic relations law, the
formation of the marital status.
Concerning obstacle number three, the controversial nature of the
subject, I can only state that the purpose is to present an honest and accur-
ate analysis of the law. However, it would be almost impossible - and
certainly very dull - to write in this field without taking sides on sped-
fic cases or theories. In every case where a preference has been ex-
pressed, I have tried to indicate conflicting policies and reasons for the
choice. This article is based primarily on decisions of the past twenty
years. The purpose is to give an up-to-date picture of the law, uncolored
by the pattern of decisions rendered at a time when the attitude of the
courts and society as a whole was considerably different than it is today.
This is not to intimate that there is no value in the older decisions, but
simply to recognize that times have changed and that to some extent the
law has followed.
Finally, as to the last obstacle, the prevalence of nonlegal material in
the area, it is my firm belief that the lawyer who knows all the law is
only half-equipped to serve his clients in a domestic relations problem.
The client who consults an attorney about a divorce or annulment prob-
lem is usually not interested in the law as such, but is deeply concerned
with the human aspects of his personal tragedy, and he expects his at-
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torney to share his concern. A knowledge of the law is not enough to
deal successfully with a complex family problem and an emotionally dis-
turbed client. The standard skills of the lawyer must be augmented by
an additional group of techniques which relate to the attitudes and moti-
vations of the parties. In addition, the attorney who handles a domestic
relations problem may be called on to work closely with a court social
worker, psychiatrist, doctor, minister, or marriage counselor. I have
not discussed these extra-legal techniques in the text because others more
competent have written elsewhere on the subject, a complete discussion
would unduly lengthen the article, and because the subject is national in
scope and not appropriate to an article on local substantive law. How-
ever, I strongly urge that every attorney in the field should broaden his
knowledge of the nonlegal problems.'
As indicated, this article is a survey of the Ohio law on the formation
of the marital status. Logically, the law of annulment should be treated,
along with divorce, as part of the broad subject of the breakup of the
family unit. However, the grounds for annulment relate to the failure
to follow certain formalities in the creation of the marriage, or to the
effect of disabilities, and for this reason this article on marriage also sets
forth the substantive law of annulment. The procedural law of annul-
ment is not discussed here, except that the two special procedural prob-
lems of choice of law and choice of divorce or annulment in Ohio are
included at the end of the article.
For convenience in cross-referencing, the text of the article and the
corresponding footnotes have been broken into separate sections.
Section 2 - Nature of Marriage
While the word "marriage" has both legal and social connotations,
as a legal term it is ambiguous in that it refers to two distinct concepts.
1-1. There are a number of recently published books which are concerned either with the
need for reform of our domestic relations law or with the overall picture. These books are
recommended for law students and lawyers who do not specialize in domestic relations law
as an invaluable aid to understanding the depth of the field and the relations between law
and policy. The seasoned practitioner will find that these volumes may challenge him to re-
examine some of his conceptions and they also will help him predict trends in this area.
One of the best recent publications is a group of four studies made of the organization
and functions of domestic relations courts, prepared for the Interprofessional Commission on
Marriage and Divorce Laws, an organization sponsored by the American Bar Association.
These detailed case studies in judicial administration are published in VIRTUE, FAMILY CASES
IN COURT (1956) (published by Duke University Press). The book is of special interest to
Ohio lawyers as one study is devoted to a detailed description of the Family Court of Lucas
County (Toledo) Ohio, whose presiding judge is chairman of the Interprofessional Commis-
sion and is one of the pioneers in the movement for domestic relations reform.
The best recent work on practice in the domestic relations area is SPELLMAN, SUCCESSFUL
MANAGEMENT OF MATRIMONIAL CASES (1954) (published by Prentice-Hall). Written by
an experienced trial lawyer from New York, this book is of interest to every practicing at-
torney. The chapters on pleading and trial procedure are based on New York law and are
of little value outside of New York. However, the chapters on attorney-client relations and
the lawyer's role in reconciliation should be read by every member of the profession.
[Vol. 14:724
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"Marriage" means the legal status of wedlock. The term also refers to
the act or contract necessary to enter into the status. The confusion aris-
ing from these separate meanings is compounded by the phrase so com-
mon in statutes and opinions: "marriage is a civil contract."
Marriage is civil in that no religious ceremony is necessary as a pre-
requisite to a legal marriage. The entry into marriage is a contract, al-
though a special type. Like other contracts, it consists of an agreement
between parties who have legal eligibility to marry. The contract is
unlike other contracts in that there are special rules relative to formalities
and eligibility which do not apply to ordinary contracts.
Marriage is also a status, involving certain rights and duties. These
incidents are determined by the law and not by the parties. An example
of the confusion between marriage as a contract and marriage as a status
is found in Ohio Revised Code section 3103.01: "Husband and wife con-
tract towards each other obligations of mutual respect, fidelity, and sup-
port." As a general statement of the law, the statute is dearly incorrect.
The obligations mentioned arise from the status of marriage, and not
from the contract; thus the parties could not expressly except the obliga-
tions of support from their marriage agreement.' 1  The fact that mar-
riage is primarily a status is shown by the case of Maynard v. Hill,"2
where the United States Supreme Court held that a legislative divorce
did not violate the prohibition against state action which impairs the
obligation of contracts.
Since marriage is a status with primarily local incidents, it is of state
rather than federal concern. It seems clear that a state could abolish
statutory marriage, abolish divorce, grant a divorce for any reason, or at-
tach any obligation to the status without running afoul of the federal
constitution.' The strength of this "local concern" doctrine is revealed
by State v. Agler.Y The defendant was a foreign diplomat stationed in
Cleveland who was sued for divorce in a state court in Ohio. In spite
of the language of the Constitution and the federal statutes which pro-
vide that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all suits against for-
eign diplomats, the Ohio court was held to have jurisdiction.
Section 3 - Policy in Favor of Freedom of Choice
Public policy strongly favors freedom of choice in regard to mar-
riage. The decision whether or not to marry and the choice of a spouse
is to be left to the persons most directly concerned. Thus, it is generally
2-1. Omo REV. CODE § 3103.06.
2-2. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
2-3. This assumes, of course, that procedural due process was complied with and that the
legislation was not retroactive so as to impair vested property or contract rights.
2-4. 280 U.S. 379 (1930), affirming 119 Ohio St. 484, 164 N.E. 524 (1928).
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held that a condition in a will or deed which is in general restraint of
marriage is void, as is a condition which has this effect although not ex-
pressly stated.3 On the other hand, conditions in partial restraint of
marriage are valid if reasonable.3 2 A condition not to marry a particu-
lar person, a member of a specific race or religion, or a prohibition
against youthful marriage is usually held valid. About the only valid
general restraint on marriage is a prohibition against remarriage by a
widow or divorced spouse. Illustrative of the policy favoring free choice
are cases which hold that corporate articles which tend to encourage hasty
or unwise marriage are invalid, 3 contracts of marriage brokers are il-
legal," - and no action lies against a person who induces another to breach
a promise to marry."
Similarly, a contract or condition which tends to terminate an existing
marriage is void. In two Ohio cases, a clause in a will left property to a
remainderman if his wife were dead or divorced at the termination of
the life estate. In both cases, the courts held the condition void and the
remainderman took the legacy absolutely.3 6
PART II - FORMALITIES IN THE CREATION
OF THE MARITAL STATUS
Section 4 - Statutory Marriage
Every state has a statute setting forth certain formalities which should
be complied with by the parties to be married. Such a marriage is com-
monly referred to as a ceremonial marriage, or more accurately as a statu-
tory marriage, as opposed to a common-law marriage. The state statutes
are basically similar and include most of the provisions listed below. Like
most such statutes, the Ohio Revised Code (Chapter 3101) is detailed
and largely self-explanatory, and therefore is not discussed in detail in
this article.
Common Statutory Marriage Provisions
(1) Minimum age of marriage. OHIO REV. CODE § 1301.01.
(2) Consent of parents if parties are minors. OHIO REV. CODE
§§ 1301.01-.04.
3-1. King v. King, 63 Ohio St. 363 (1900) (dictum). See also cases collected in 3 PAGE,
WILLS § 1302 (3d ed. 1941).
3-2. Saslow v. Saslow, 104 Ohio App. 157, 147 N.E.2d 262 (1957).
3-3. Attorney Gen. v. Marital Endowment Corp., 257 Mich. 691, 242 N.W. 297 (1932).
3-4. Morrison v. Rogers, 115 Cal. 252, 46 Pac. 1072 (1896).
3-5. Stiffler v. Boehm, 206 N.Y. Supp. 187 (Sup. Ct. 1924). See also 21 VA. L. REv. 125
(1934); 26 ILL. L. REv. 454 (1931).
3-6. Fineman v. Central Nat'l Bank, 161 N.E.2d 557 (Ohio P. Ct. 1959). Moores v.
Guryne, 33 Ohio C.C. Dec. 463, 15 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 31 (1911).
[Vol. 14:724
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(3) Application for marriage license. OHIo REV. CODE § 3101.05.
(4) Blood test required. OHio REV. CODE § 3101.05
(5) Official record of marriage. OHIO REV. CODE § 3101.13.
(6) License authorizing certain persons to officiate at marriage.
OHIO REV. §§ 3101.08-.12.
The Ohio statute is unusual in one respect. Most states permit non-
residents to marry in their state. In Ohio, however, the wife must be a
resident of the state and of the county where she applies for the license,
unless the husband is in the armed forces. '
In states which have abolished common-law marriage, a common
problem is the effect on the marriage of noncompliance with the techni-
cal requirements of the statute. This problem has not arisen in Ohio
nor is it likely to so long as Ohio allows common-law marriages, since a
defective statutory marriage is almost always valid as a common-law mar-
riage.' 2 In states which do not permit common-law marriages, the courts
generally hold that bona fide substantial compliance with the statute is
sufficient. Thus, technical irregularities, such as failure to file applica-
tion for the license in advance, failure to observe the statutory waiting
period, issuance of the license to a minor without parental consent, or
failure of the judge or derk to sign the license, do not invalidate the
marriage.' Further, the doctrine of the de facto officer would validate
a marriage where the person officiating acts in good faith as a person
authorized to perform marriages, even though in fact he is not author-
ized. Thus, a justice of the peace whose term had expired or an unor-
dained acting minister could perform a valid ceremony. -
Section 5 - History of Common-Law Marriage
Ohio is one of the eighteen states which recognize marriages based on
agreement between the parties without compliance with statutory proce-
dures. The validity of such a marriage first came before an American
court in Fenton v. Reed,' an 1809 decision of the New York Court of
Appeals. The court upheld the marriage on the ground that no formal
ceremony was required by the common law. It seems clear that the de-
cision was incorrect. First, the court overlooked an early New York
statute which prescribed marriage formalities and provided that an at-
4-1. OHIO REV. CODE § 3101.05.
4-2. Carmichael v. State, 12 Ohio St. 553 (1861).
4-3. Rediker v. Rediker, 212 P.2d 612 (Cal. App. 1950); Partwood v. Parrwood, 109 S.W.2d
515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
4-4. Knapp v. Knapp, 149 Md. 263, 131 Ad. 329 (1925); Note, 34 HARv. L. REv. 782
(1926).
5-1. 4 Johns. R. 52 (N.Y. 1809).
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tempt to marry without compliance with the statute was a criminal of-
fense. Second, the court assumed incorrectly that informal marriage was
sanctioned by the common law of England at the time of the American
Revolution. The fact was that informal marriage was tolerated by the
Roman law from the time of the Roman Republic and by the Church
in medieval times. Such marriages were recognized by the English canon-
law courts until abolished by the Marriage Act of 1753. Since that time,
informal marriages have been invalid in England, and the English courts
have held that informal marriage has never been a part of the English
common law.
Fenton v. Reed had a very important influence upon the other state
courts, and when the Ohio Supreme Court was first faced with the prob-
lem, the court upheld common-law marriages, 2 citing cases from New
York, California, Missouri, and Mississippi, all of which were based on
Fenton v. Reed. They completely ignored the substantial body of case
law which had rejected common-law marriage.'
Thus, remarkably, the important subject of the validity of an informal
marriage in Ohio is at least partially based on the false premises accepted
as correct by the New York Court.'
Section 6 - The Legal Effect of a Common-Law Marriage
There is a popular misconception among laymen that a common-law
marriage is somehow less binding than a statutory or ceremonial mar-
riage. This view is clearly incorrect. Legally, a common-law marriage
is just as valid for all purposes as any other kind of marriage. Like other
marriages, a common-law marriage can only be terminated by death or
divorce. Thus, a man who contracts a common-law marriage and then
without benefit of divorce marries again can be prosecuted for bigamy.6'
Likewise, a death-bed repudiation of a common-law marriage by one of
the parties is completely ineffective. 2
The misconception referred to above has been given currency by oc-
casional dicta in opinions of Ohio courts. In Estate of Redman, the Ohio
Supreme Court said, "such informal marriages are seldom recognized
and are held valid by courts only to protect the rights of innocent per-
5-2. Carmichael v. State, 12 Ohio St. 553 (1861).
5-3. The first American case to reject common-law marriage was Milford v. Worcester, 7
Mass. 48 (1810).
5-4. The most detailed judicial discussion of the history of common-law marriage is found
in In re Robert's Estate, 58 Wyo. 438, 133 P.2d 492 (1943). See also KEEZER, MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE §§ 28-30 (3d ed. 1946).
6-1. Umbenhour v. Umbenhour, 12 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 289 (Cir. Ct. 1909), aff'd, 85 Ohio
St. 238, 97 N.E. 832 (1912).
6-2. In re Barrett, 48 Ohio Bull. 222 (P. Ct. 1904). See also Drach v. Drach, 9 Ohio N.P.
(n.s.) 353 (Hamilton County Ct. 1910).
[VoL 14:724
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sons." This statement, which was dictum in the Redman case, has
been interpreted to mean that common-law marriages will be recognized
only to protect the legitimacy of children, a doctrine which is applied in
some states. Yet it is cldear that the statement did not really mean what
it seems to, but means rather that the marriage may be upheld at the be-
hest of the parties to it." The statement is indicative of the confusion
between the effect of a common-law marriage and the amount of proof
necessary to sustain it. An analysis of the cases decided since the Redman
case demonstrates that the courts are more apt to sustain a common-law
marriage where the rights of children or other heirs are involved. Where
the issue of validity is raised by the parties themselves for selfish reasons,
as for example in support or probate cases, the courts will scrutinize the
evidence closely and require proof of the alleged marriage by clear and
convincing evidence. 5
Section 7 - The Essentials of a Common-Law Marriage
The first essential of a common-law marriage is the capacity of the
parties to contract marriage. The rules as to capacity are the same for a
common-law marriage as for a statutory marriage and are dealt with in
later sections of this article.
The second essential element of a common-law marriage is a con-
tractual agreement to presently enter into the marital status. No particu-
lar form or wording is necessary. The contract need not be in writing,
nor witnessed.' 1  The contract must be made per verba de praesenti, i.e.,
by words in the present tense. Dictum in some of the older cases indi-
cated that mutual promises to marry in the future, followed by cohabita-
tion, would constitute a valid marriage. This supposed rule has been
expressly rejected in Ohio -2 and apparently is not accepted in any state
today.
There is one area where the Ohio law on common-law marriage is
still in doubt. Are the elements of capacity and agreement the only es-
6-3. 135 Ohio St. 554, 558-59, 21 N.2d 659, 661 (1939). See also In re Speeler's Estate,
22 Ohio L. Abs. (P. Ct. 1936).
6-4. Markley v. Hudson, 143 Ohio St. 163, 54 N.2d 304 (1944).
6-5. Ibid.; Unbenhower v. Labus, 85 Ohio St. 238, 97 N.E. 832 (1912); Gatterdam v.
Gatterdam, 86 Ohio App. 29, 85 N.E.2d 526 (1949). The burden of proving the agreement
by clear and convincing evidence may be almost impossible to overcome in some situations. A
recent court of appeals decision held that where the alleged common-law wife tried to qualify
as a widow of the deceased, the "dead man" statute prevented her from testifying as to the
agreement. Lynch v. Romas, 139 N.E.2d 352 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956). As further evidence
of a recent trend toward imposing a high standard of proof in these cases, see In re Estate of
Maynard, 117 Ohio App. 315 (1962); Skorapa v. Skorapa, 177 N.E.2d 310 (Ohio P. Ct.
1961); Etter v. Von Aschen, 163 N.E.2d 197 (Ohio P. Ct. 1959); Brastein v. Sedivy, 153
N.E.2d 541 (Ohio P. Cr. 1957).
7-1. See cases cited in note 6-5 supra.
7-2. Duncan v. Duncan, 10 Ohio St. 181 (1859).
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sentials of a valid common-law marriage, or is performance of the agree-
ment also required? A few states have held that performance of the
agreement, i.e., cohabitation as husband and wife, usually evidenced by
reputation of the marriage in the community, is required before such a
marriage becomes valid. The great weight of authority is that cohabi-
tation is not required. A typical statement of the majority rule is found
in a Minnesota case where the court said:
The whole law on the subject is that, to render competent parties hus-
band and wife, they must and need only agree in the present tense to be
such, no time being contemplated to elapse before the assumption of the
status. If cohabitation follows, it adds nothing in law, although it may
be evidence of marriage. It is mutual, present consent, lawfully ex-
pressed, which makes the marriage.7-3
Another clear-cut example of the majority rule is Great Northern Ry.
v. Johnson7 where the bride and groom, living in different states, at-
tempted to contract a common-law marriage by mail. The offer of
present marriage was accepted by mail, and the husband died before any
cohabitation occurred. The court held that the marriage was valid.
In spite of occasional text statements to the contrary, this problem has
never been adjudicated in any reported Ohio case. In all of the Ohio
cases there was proof of cohabitation, so that any statement by the court
that cohabitation and "holding out" are essential elements of a marriage
was dearly dictum. In Umbenhower v. Labus,75 the leading Ohio case
on common-law marriage, the syllabus states that an agreement in
praesenti followed by cohabitation and reputation establishes a valid
marriage, thus inferring that cohabitation is essential. Yet the opinion
states, "the evidence of the marriage, in part at least, consists in the
immediate and continued course of conduct of the parties in reference to
each other in their domestic and social life."7 6  This quotation indicates
that the court thought of cohabitation essentially as strong evidentiary
proof of the agreement, but not essential to the marriage where the agree-
ment can be proved by other means. The later case of Markley v. Hud-
son 7-7 repeated the syllabus of the Umbenhower case, and also repeated
the quotation given above as syllabus number two, thus failing to resolve
the matter. A substantial number of lower courts have repeated the
syllabus of the Umbenhower case and stated as dictum that cohabitation
is required. Two recent cases are the only ones in which the problem
is carefully considered, and both cases in dictum state a preference for
7-3. Estate of Hulett, 66 Minn. 327, 69 N.W. 31 (1896).
7-4. 254 Fed. 683 (8th Cir. 1918).
7-5. Umbenhower v. Labus, 85 Ohio St. 238, 97 N.E. 832 (1912).
7-6. Id. at 244, 97 N.E. at 833.
7-7. 143 Ohio St. 163, 54 N.E.2d 304 (1944).
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the majority view. In Leibrock v. Leibrock, the court states: "There is
ample respectable authority holding that cohabitation and reputation are
not essential to a common-law marriage... cohabitation and reputation
merely become evidential facts which permit the existence of the contract
to be inferred."'  In Gatterdam v. Gatterdam,7 the court concludes
that the language of the Umbenhower and Markley cases lends strength
to the theory that reputation and cohabitation are only evidential ele-
ments, and the sine qua non of common-law marriage is the agreement.
In both of these cases the conclusions expressed were dictum as cohabita-
tion was proved.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the cases. First, it is agreed
by all that a contract in praesenti is a requisite of common-law marriage.
The agreement need not be expressly proved, but can be inferred from
cohabitation and reputation 7 " Second, the question of whether cohabi-
tation and reputation are evidential elements only, or are vital prerequi-
sites to the marriage, has not yet been decided in Ohio and could be de-
cided either way.
The issue will probably arise where the husband dies shortly after the
agreement and the wife is claiming a widow's share. If there is no
cohabitation proved, and the only evidence of the agreement is the testi-
mony of the alleged wife, the court need not decide if cohabitation is
necessary. It could rule against the marriage on the ground that the un-
supported testimony of one party does not satisfy the requirement that
the agreement must be proved by dear and convincing evidence. If the
agreement is dearly proved, such as where it is written, as in the Great
Northern Railway case supra,"- n or where there are independent wit-
nesses to an oral ceremony, the court will have to face the issue. It is
submitted that in such a case the court should follow the majority view
and uphold the marriage. If the minority rule is followed, the next ques-
tion is the quantum of proof of cohabitation and reputation necessary.
This is difficult to determine, and a rule which requires only clear proof
of the agreement is much easier to administer. Further, it is clear that
no cohabitation is necessary for a valid statutory marriage. There is
some utility in adopting a consistent rule which applies to all marriages,
as long as the statutory ceremony or the common-law contract can be
dearly established. Finally, if the minority rule is adopted, it seems
logically inconsistent to say that the relations between the parties do not
ripen into marriage until an indefinite period of cohabitation and "hold-
7-8. 107 NXE.2d 418, 422 (Ohio C.P. 1952).
7-9. 86 Ohio App. 29, 85 N.E.2d 526 (1949).
7-10. Markley v. Hudson, 143 Ohio St. 163, 54 N.E.2d 304 (1944).
7-11. 254 Fed. 683 (8th Cir. 1918).
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ing out" has occurred, and yet provide, as the Ohio law does, that such
cohabitation is a criminal offense.7"2
Section 8 - Proxy and Absentee Marriages
A proxy marriage is one in which one or both of the principals are
absent and are represented by an agent or proxy who is present with
authority to act for his principal in the marriage ceremony. An absentee
marriage is one in which the parties contracting marriage are not in each
other's physical presence, but perform the ceremony at a distance. An
example of the latter is a war-time trans-Pacific radio-telephone marriage,
where the wife was on a telephone in Florida, the husband was on an-
other telephone overseas, and the officiating minister was on an exten-
sion in Florida. The marriage was held to be a valid ceremonial mar-
riage by the Florida Attorney General.'
Historically, such marriages were recognized by the Catholic Church
about 1300 A.D. and are expressly authorized today in most Latin Ameri-
can countries.' -  A few states have legislation on the subject, but the
great majority neither expressly prohibit nor approve such marriages.
The Ohio statute requires the personal presence of both parties when ap-
plying for a license although there is no express requirement of personal
presence at the ceremony.' By implication, a proxy or absentee mar-
riage would probably not qualify as a valid statutory marriage under
Ohio law.
During World War II and the Korean conflict, there were a num-
ber of proxy and absentee marriages, the validity of which has been tested
in several recent cases. Most courts hold that the law of the jurisdiction
where the ceremony is held governs the validity of a proxy marriage, and
if valid where performed, it is valid everywhere. Thus, a Mexican dou-
ble-proxy marriage between an overseas soldier and an Ohio girl was
held valid by an Ohio court where the ceremony was a valid statutory
marriage under the law of Mexico.' In the case of an absentee mar-
riage, such as one by telephone where the marriage purports to be a cere-
monial marriage, the law of the state where the minister is located gov-
erns, rather than the law of the states from which the parties are tele-
phoning." Where an absentee marriage is treated as a common-law
marriage, the contract must be divided into an offer and an acceptance,
7-12. OHIO REV. CODE § 2905.08 forbids cohabitation in a state of fornication.
8-1. FLA. Ops. Arr'Y GEN. 490 (1943-44).
8-2. Lorenzen, Marriage by Proxy, 32 HARV. L. REV. 473 (1919).
8-3. OHIO REV. CODE § 3101.05.
8-4. Hardin v. Davis, 30 Ohio Op. 524 (C.P. 1945).
8-5. FLA. OPS. Ar'xy GEN. 490 (1943-44).
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and the law of the state where the acceptance occurs governs the validity
of the marriage."
In jurisdictions where a common-law marriage is valid, a proxy or
absentee marriage is valid unless the state requires cohabitation in addi-
tion to an agreement. 7 In a recent case, a soldier in Burma married a
girl in West Virginia by proxy. Upon his return from service and prior
to any cohabitation, he sued in an Ohio court for annulment. The court
held that the marriage was not a valid ceremonial marriage since the
West Virginia statutes did not expressly authorize proxy marriages. This
seems to be a questionable decision since the statute does not forbid them,
and the weight of recent authority seems to validate such a marriage un-
less expressly prohibited.' The court then considered the marriage a
common-law marriage and held that it was valid since West Virginia
law requires both agreement and cohabitation."
Such marriages have been sustained in other recent cases outside of
Ohio"-0 and probably would be sustained in Ohio as valid common-law
marriages. They would certainly be valid if the Ohio courts were to
adopt the majority view that cohabitation is not an essential of a common-
law marriage." 1' It should be noted that at one time proxy marriages
were a common method of evading the immigration laws. However, the
McCarran-Walter Act of 1952"- 2 provides that for immigration and
naturalization purposes, proxy and absentee marriages are not valid unless
the marriage has been consummated.
PART III - DISABILITIES
Section 9 - General
As already noted in Section 2 supra, entry into marital status consists
of a contract evidenced by certain formalities in its execution and consist-
ing of a mutual agreement between parties who have legal eligibility to
marry. Where any one of these three factors is absent, the marriage is
either void or voidable.
8-6. In Great Northern Ry. v. Johnson, 254 Fed. 683 (8th Cir. 1918), the groom sent a
letter from Minnesota, proposing immediate marriage. The bride received the letter in Mis-
souri, signed her acceptance on a duplicate copy, and mailed it to the groom. The court up-
held the marriage as a valid absentee common-law marriage under Missouri law.
8-7. United States v. Layton, 68 F. Supp. 247 (S.D. Fla. 1946); Noted 32 IowA L. REV.
774 (1947); 21 So. CALIF. L. REV. 206 (1948); 25 TEXAS L. REV. 681 (1947).
8-8. See cases cited Howery, Marriage by Proxy and Other Informal Marriages, 13 U. KAN.
CITY L. REV. 38 (1944). See also 33 DEcs. CoMP. GEN. 446, 447 (1954); 32 DECS. COMp.
GEN. 144 (1952), holding that the majority common-law rule in the states is that proxy
marriages are valid unless expressly prohibited by statute or judicial decision, and that the
majority common-law view validates common-law marriage where no cohabitation has occurred.
8-9. Respole v. Respole, 70 N.E.2d 565 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
8-10. United States v. Barrons, 91 F. Supp. 319 (N.D. Calif. 1950); Fernandes v. Fernandes,
87 N.Y.S.2d 707 (App. Div. 1949); Ferraro v. Ferraro, 77 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Kings County Ct.
1948).
8-11. See notes 7-3 - 7-11 supra.
8-12. McCarran-Walter Act, U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (35) (1953).
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Certain factors which impair the validity of a marriage relate to the
agreement itself. Like other contracts, the marriage contract must be
made by persons who have mental capacity to contract. The rules relat-
ing to insanity and intoxication are essentially the same for both types
of contracts. Nonmarital contracts by minors are voidable, and in
the marital area we have a parallel rule. For policy reasons, the rules
here are different, and the term "nonage" is used in marriage law because
the alternatives, "infancy" or "minority," have a technical meaning in
contract law; they refer to someone who is not yet twenty-one years of
age. Finally, marriages like other contracts may be avoided if the agree-
ment is the result of fraud, duress, or mistake. Marriage is usually much
more difficult to avoid on these last three grounds than most contracts
because of a strong public policy in favor of preserving an existing mari-
tal status.
Assuming that the parties have complied with the formalities and
have made a valid agreement, there remain certain classes of defects
which relate to eligibility to enter into marital status. The first group of
factors relates to the physical health of the parties. A second category
includes factors which make it unlawful for a person to marry anyone
who comes from a specified group or class. Incestuous marriages are in-
cluded in this category, barring marriage between persons of a certain
relationship by blood or marriage. Miscegenous marriages between per-
sons of different races are also included. The third defect is a disability
imposed by the law which makes it impossible for a person who is al-
ready married to contract a valid marriage with anyone. At common
law, a bigamous marriage was absolutely void. This rule has been modi-
fied somewhat in Ohio. Further, a marriage which is bigamous in in-
ception, but where cohabitation occurs after the impediment is removed,
may be a valid common-law marriage.
Section 10 - Relation Between Disabilities and Annulment Law
Most of the cases involving disabilities are annulment cases. For this
reason, the nature of the rules and the effect of a particular disability in
making a marriage either void or voidable depend in some degree upon
the development of annulment law. Historically, the judicial disaffirm-
ance of a voidable marriage was referred to as an annulment action, while
a declaration that a marriage was void was properly called a declaration
of nullity or a libel of nullity. This distinction is still adhered to in some
states, but in Ohio and in this article, the term annulment is used to refer
to either type of action.
At the time of the American Revolution, the English common-law
9-1. See Section 20 infra.
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courts had not established a body of law dealing with marriage or annul-
ment since jurisdiction in annulment cases was exclusively vested in the
ecclesiastical courts. After the separation from England, it was univer-
sally conceded that no court in this country directly succeeded to the jur-
isdiction or body of substantive law of the canon-law courts. Thus, the
problem arose as to what law should be applied. A few states solved the
problem by legislation, adopting a detailed annulment code. In Ohio
there has been no such statutory treatment of the subject. In the absence
of statute, most states, including Ohio, have held that the equity courts
have inherent jurisdiction to annul marriages, just as they may rescind
other contracts."' American courts have generally held that an equity
court can annul a marriage for civil disability, but not for canon-law dis-
ability unless some statute indicates that the policy of the state is in accord
with the canon-law rule. Thus, defects which would render any contract
invalid, such as fraud, duress, or insanity, constitute civil defects and no
statute is necessary. However, defects which have no parallel in normal
contract recision cases, such as the defects of impotency or incest, are
treated as canon-law disabilities and not part of normal equity jurispru-
dence.
Section 11 - The Effect of the Disability: Void or Voidable
The question of whether a particular defect renders a marriage void
or voidable will be discussed in subsequent sections in connection with
each specific defect. A few introductory observations are worth inserting
at this point so that the conflicting doctrines may be reconciled. Gen-
erally, the older decisions classified each defect as void or voidable, the
choice resting largely upon historical precedent. Under early common
law, canon-law disabilities apparently rendered a marriage voidable, and
the marriage was valid for all purposes until avoided by court decree.
Where the court was faced with a civil defect, the usual solution was to
adopt the comparable rule from contract law. The normal contract rule
seems to be that insanity voids a contract, while fraud, duress, and minor-
ity render a contract voidable." These rules, to some extent, have been
assimilated into marriage law.
Where a court concludes that a defect renders a marriage voidable,
the usual consequences attached by the law are as follows:
(1) The marriage can be ratified by acts or conduct of the parties
after the defect is removed.
(2) The marriage is valid until avoided by a court decree, that is,
10-1. Waymire v. Jetmore, 22 Ohio St. 271 (1872).
11-1. RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTs §§ 13, 18, 431 (b), 476 (1932).
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no self-help remedy is permitted. The parties cannot disaffirm the mar-
riage by walking away from it.
(3) The marriage can be disaffirmed only in a direct suit between
the parties to the marriage. No collateral attack on the marriage is
permitted.
Where a court concludes that a marriage is void, the usual incidents
attached to the finding are the converse of the above. That is:
(1) Ratification is ineffective.
(2) The marriage is invalid without the necessity of a court decree.
(3) Collateral attack on the marriage is permitted.
It should be apparent that the terms void and voidable are simply
verbal labels used to describe the total of the above three factors.11-2 It
also is clear that there is no logical necessity for classifying marriage in
only two ways, void or voidable, in terms of the above three rules. Thus,
it would be possible to hold that a marriage is void in that no court decree
is necessary and collateral attack is permitted, and still hold that ratifi-
cation is possible. This is exactly what the Supreme Court of Ohio has
done as to nonage marriages."' -
The point is that a court should not blindly attach the label void or
voidable to a defect without understanding the effect of the label. For-
tunately, most modern courts do look to the effects of the label and de-
cide that the marriage is void or voidable on the basis of policy considera-
tions. One of these considerations involves the strength of public policy
against the marriage. Thus, if there is very stong sentiment against a
particular marriage, for example, a miscegenous marriage in the South,
the court will usually declare the marriage void. If the marriage is be-
tween first cousins, the court will usually hold such a marriage voidable
as there is no strong public bias against such a marriage."' Another
factor which often influences the court is the relative ease of proof.
Where a defect is difficult to prove, and is of the type which could be in-
vented years after the marriage to evade obligations of support, the court
is apt to hold such a marriage voidable and then bar the plaintiff on the
basis of unclean hands or ratification. The defects of fraud and insanity
are examples of this situation.
A final word of caution is necessary. In most judicial opinions, the
11-2. The three factors listed are not the only incidents of the labels void and voidable, al-
though they are the most common. Several courts have held that lack of clean hands is a
defense in an annulment action based on a voidable marriage, but not in an action based on a
void marriage. Further, the decree in an annulment of a void marriage is sometimes related
back to the time of the marriage, whereas it becomes effective only when rendered in the case
of a voidable marriage. To the extent that an annulment decree relates back to the date of
the marriage, see Note, 7 STAN. L. REv. 529 (1955).
11-3. Shafher v. State, 20 Ohio 1 (1851).
11-4. Walker v. Walker, 84 N.E.2d 258 (Ohio C.P. 1948).
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statement that a marriage is void or voidable is dictum. In the typical
annulment case, the suit is between the parties, collateral attack or ratifi-
cation is not involved, and the decision would be the same whether the
marriage were treated as void or voidable.
Section 12 - Insanity and Intoxication
A person who is insane or mentally ill at the time of the marriage
ceremony cannot contract a valid marriage. The mental incapacity must
exist at the time of the ceremony, and if the ceremony takes place during
a lucid interval, the marriage will be valid. The test of capacity to marry
is essentially the same as the test used in cases of capacity to make a con-
tract, deed, or will. In one case, the court said that each party to the
marriage must understand the nature of the marital contract and the
duties and responsibilities of the marital status." -1
The Ohio cases are in accord with the weight of authority in other
states that neither guardianship nor commitment by the probate court are
conclusive on the issue of mental capacity." -  The cases generally hold
that the burden of proving insanity is on the person attacking the mar-
riage, since sanity is presumed and there is a strong presumption favoring
the validity of a marriage which complies with legal formalities. Where
marriage takes place during a period when the person is under guardian-
ship for insanity or subject to a judicial commitment order, the courts
hold that the decree is prima facie evidence of insanity, and sanity must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 1" The cases which hold
that commitment to a mental hospital is not conclusive of capacity to
marry were all decided prior to the enactment in 1939 of Ohio Revised
Code section 5122.36. This statute provides, with certain exceptions,
that indeterminate hospitalization under court order is also an adjudica-
tion of mental incompetency." -  This statute appears to make evidence
of commitment conclusive on the issue of capacity to marry. The only
Ohio decision on this issue assumed that this was the effect of the statute,
12-1. Dozer v. Dozer, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 507 (Ct. App. 1930). Note that the language used
to describe the test is essentially the same as that used by the Ohio Supreme Court to describe
testamentary capacity. See Niemes v. Niemes, 97 Ohio St. 145, 119 N.E. 503 (1917).
12-2. Dozer v. Dozer, supra note 12-1; McCleary v. Barcalow, 6 Ohio C.C.R. 481 (Cir. Ct.
1891); Heath v. Heath, 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 123 (C.P. 1924); Goodheart v. Ransley, 11
Ohio Dec. Reprint 655 (C.P. 1892), aff'd, Goodheart v. Speer, 18 Ohio C.C.R. 679 (Cir. Ct.
1893).
12-3. Heath v. Heath, supra note 12-2.
12-4. Prior to the revision of the Mental Hospitalization Act, effective October 25, 1961, the
comparable section was OHIo REv. CODE § 5123.57, which provided that a patient in a state
mental hospital was incompetent to enter into any agreement without probate court approval.
Apparently the new statute applies to patients in private hospitals as well, so long as they are
under court commitment. The statute applies to both patients in residence, and to patients on
"trial visit' or out-patient status. The present section, 5122.36, was amended again during
the past session of the legislature. See H.R. 758, 105th Gen. Assembly (1963).
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but held that the statute did not invalidate a marriage by a patient on a
trial visit from an Ohio mental hospital where the marriage took place
outside Ohio. 2- 5
There are no Ohio cases directly in point on whether an insane mar-
riage is void or voidable, although the cases contain dictum both ways. 12- 6
The lower courts in Ohio have held that the insane party to the marriage
can ratify the marriage after he becomes sane, thus indicating that the
marriage is merely voidable.' -7 There are no Ohio cases in which the
issue involved a collateral attack on such a marriage, nor are there any
cases involving the right of the parties to disaffirm the marriage by ac-
tions other than court decree.
Suit to annul the marriage may be brought by the guardian or by the
party who was insane, provided he is sane at the time he brings the
action."'-8 If the sane spouse sues the spouse under guardianship for
divorce, the guardian may cross-petition for an annulment without the
consent of his ward.' -9 In one case, the guardian filed the action prior
to the death of the ward, and the court held that the action did not abate,
but could be continued by the administrator of the deceased. "- °
There are no cases in Ohio involving the right of the sane spouse to
sue for annulment. Generally, the right of the sane party to annul de-
pends on whether the defect renders the marriage void or voidable. Those
states which by statute or case law hold the marriage void permit the sane
partner to sue unless he had knowledge of the insanity at the time of the
marriage."2 - "'
Intoxication caused by alcohol or narcotics at the time of marriage
invalidates the marriage for the same reason that insanity avoids it:
the lack of intelligent consent. Although there are no Ohio cases on the
subject, the rules of insanity probably would be applied. Cases from
other states indicate that intoxication alone will seldom serve to invali-
date a marriage. As stated by a Texas court: "To avoid a contract on
this ground, the obligor must have been so drunk as to have dethroned
12-5. Seabold v. Seabold, 84 Ohio App. 83, 84 N.E.2d 521 (1948). See also OHIO OPS.
ATT'Y GEN. 7106 (1956).
12-6. McDowell v. Sapp, 39 Ohio St. 558 (1883) (insane marriage voidable and may be
ratified - dictum); Waymire v. Jetmore, 22 Ohio St. 271 (1872) (insane marriage void -
dictum); Benton v. Benton, 16 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 121 (Cir. Ct. 1909) (insane marriage
void - dictum); Heath v. Heath, 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 123 (C.P. 1924) (insane marriage
void but could be ratified - dictum); Goodheart v. Ransley, 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint 655 (C.P.
1892) (void but could be ratified - dictum).
12-7. See cases in note 12-6 supra.
12-8. Ibid.
12-9. Duncan v. Duncan, 88 Ohio App. 243 (1950).
12-10. Heath v. Heath, 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 123 (C.P. 1924).
12-11. The problem is discussed in detail in Hoadley v. Hoadley, 244 N.Y. 424, 155 N.E.
728 (1927). See also Friedman v. Friedman, 64 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
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reason, memory and judgment.... " 2  As a practical matter, suits to
avoid a marriage for intoxication are almost never successful. In this
field, judges and jurors view with extreme scepticism the plaintiff who
testifies that he was so drunk that he did not know what he was doing,
and yet admits that he stood up before the minister without falling flat on
his face."'2-
Section 13 - Nonage
The "age of consent" is the age at which a person can enter into a
valid marriage; and a marriage in which one or both of the parties is
below this age is referred to as a "nonage" marriage. Unlike other con-
tracts, a marriage entered into by a minor who is over the age of consent
cannot be avoided when the minor reaches majority. This is because
marriage is not only a contract, but also a status involving social inter-
ests and interests of third persons such as children. But a minor's prom-
ise to marry can be avoided like any other contract, as none of the inci-
dents of the status have been assumed.
The age of consent under the common law was 14 for males and 12
for females. A marriage below the age of 7 was void, and a marriage
over age 7 and below the age of consent was voidable. The present stat-
ute provides that males aged 18 and females aged 16 may marry.' 1 The
other provisions of the marriage chapter have been held to be directory
rather than mandatory - thus the lack of a license does not invalidate
a marriage. One might assume that the age statute would be construed
the same way, but the Ohio courts have without exception held that the
statute does more than fix the age at which a license may issue; it fixes
the age of consent."8 2  Thus, it seems clear that a marriage below the
statutory age is invalid whether it is a ceremonial or a common-law mar-
riage. The same section of the code also provides, in equally mandatory
terms, that the consent of the parents must be obtained if the party is un-
der age 21, and yet Ohio, as most states, holds that lack of parental con-
sent has no effect on the validity of the marriage. 3
Although a nonage marriage is invalid, it may be ratified when the
12-12. Wells v. Houston, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 629, 648, 57 S.W. 584, 594 (1900). See also
Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 942 (1958).
12-13. Feigenbaum v. Feigenbaum, 210 Ark. 186, 194 S.W.2d 1012 (1946) (plaintiff
alleged under influence of codeine appeared normal to license clerk and justice of peace -
annulment denied); Christoph v. Sims, 234 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (plaintiff
intoxicated, but could drive his car - annulment denied); Price v. Price, 190 At. 104 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1937). But see Mahan v. Mahan, 88 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1956); Annot., 57 A.L.R.
2d 1246 (1958).
13-1. Omo REv. CODE § 3101.01.
13-2. Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio St. 23 (1884); Shafher v. State, 20 Ohio 1 (1851).
13-3. Holtz v. Dick, supra note 13-2.
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underage party reaches the age of consent."' -  Most of the ratification
cases involve continued cohabitation, but any unambiguous act is suffi-
cient. Thus, in one case the court held that the wife, although presently
living apart from her husband, could ratify her nonage marriage by a
letter addressed "Dear Husband."' -
Absent ratification, it is clear that the underage spouse can have the
marriage annulled either before or after reaching the age of consent.
Some very harsh language has been used by courts and text writers as to
the right of a person under the age of consent to avoid a marriage which
has been consummated, and yet the general rule is to grant the annul-
ment as a matter of right, regardless of the equitable rule of clean hands.
There are several cases in which an underage male married a girl, lied
about his age to her, perjured himself in the license application, deserted
the girl and the child born of the marriage just before reaching the statu-
tory age, and nevertheless was granted a decree of annulment from an
equity court. 13-6
There is little case law in Ohio on the right of anyone other than the
underage party to avoid the marriage. The general rule is that in the
absence of an express statute, only the underage party can annul. The
other spouse cannot avoid the marriage simply because his spouse has
such a privilege. 3' Although there are no cases on the subject, it is
possible that the spouse who is over the age of consent could annul for
fraud if the underage party had misrepresented his age. Most states also
have held that the parents of the underage party cannot annul the mar-
riage. There are two Ohio cases in accord. 
13
1
It is not clear whether a nonage marriage in Ohio is void, voidable, or
something in between. The confusion stems from the earliest case to
reach the Ohio Supreme Court, Shafher v. State,13 an 1851 case which is
still the leading supreme court opinion on this subject. In this case, the
court held that an underage marriage could be disaffirmed or avoided by
the underage party by means other than a judicial decree. As pointed out
in Section 11 supra, the normal rule is that a voidable marriage is treated
as valid until it is declared invalid by a court decree. In the Shafher case,
the boy married while underage, deserted his wife, and remarried without
having his first marriage annulled. A conviction of bigamy was set aside,
and the court said that an underage marriage was void, but could be rati-
13-4. Ibid.; In re Zemmick, 76 N.E.2d 902 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946).
13-5. Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio St. 23 (1884).
13-6. Carlton v. Carlton, 76 Ohio App. 338, 64 N.E.2d 428 (1945); Swenson v. Swenson,
179 Wis. 536, 192 N.W. 70 (1923).
13-7. 3 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 31.09 (2d ed. 1945).
13-8. Klinebell v. Hilton, 2 Ohio L. Abs. 637 (Ct. App. 1924); Peefer v. State, 42 Ohio
App. 276, 182 N.E. 117 (1931) (dictum).
13-9. 20 Ohio 1 (1851).
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fied. The decision did not indicate whether the operative act of avoid-
ance was the desertion of the first wife or the later marriage. In either
case, the theory is irreconcilable with the orthodox view that a nonage
marriage is only voidable. For this reason, the Ohio view has been
sharply criticised by text writers and courts of other states as contrary to
both reason and the weight of authority.'
If the Shafher case is still the law in Ohio, then a nonage marriage
is void because no annulment is necessary, and is also voidable since it
is not subject to collateral attack. 3 ' Since the Shafher decision, lower
courts which have dealt with the problem have reached conflicting deci-
sions. Some courts have said that the marriage is void 3 - ' while others
have held it voidable." -' In many of the cases, the language used was
dictum and the same result would have been reached under either theory.
In none of the cases was the problem of the Shafher case considered, i.e.,
the right to avoid without judicial action. The cases which squarely hold
the marriage voidable are all cases denying collateral attack. Examples
are the case which holds that the state cannot attack the marriage by
convicting one spouse of contributing to the delinquency of his child
bride," - 4 and Courtright v. Courtright,'3 -5 which was affirmed without
opinion by the supreme court, holding that where the underage wife
dies before reaching the age of consent, her brothers cannot attack the
marriage in an heirship proceeding.
The text writers and opinions which have criticized the Shafher deci-
sion have assumed that the doctrine is too deeply intrenched in Ohio law
to be overturned. Surprisingly, no one has pointed out what seems to
this writer a fatal flaw in the reasoning of the supreme court in that case.
The court said that the parties could avoid the marriage without a decree
because equity courts did not have annulment jurisdiction and no statute
authorized annulment for this cause. "For our law furnishes no method
13-10. Owen v. Coffey, 201 Ala. 531, 78 So. 885 (1918); Walls v. State, 32 Ark. 565
(1877); State v. Cone, 86 Wis. 498, 57 N.W. 50 (1893).
13-11. Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio St. 23 (1884) (dictum that parents could not collaterally
attack an under-age marriage).
13-12. Carlton v. Carlton, 76 Ohio App. 338, 64 NE.2d 428 (1945); Gill v. Gill, 2 Ohio
L Abs. 14 (Ct. App. 1923); State v. Wilcox, 26 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 343 (Juv. Ct. 1926); Ott
v. Ott, 3 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 684 (C.P. 1895); Vernon v. Vernon, 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 365
(C.P. 1884).
13-13. In re Zemnick, 76 N.E.2d 902 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946); Peefer v. State, 42 Ohio App.
276, 182 N.E. 117 (1931); Klinebell v. Hilton, 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 167 (C.P. 1924); Allen
v. Allen, 21 Ohio L. Rep. 313 (C.P. 1923); Pearlman v. Pearlman, 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 46
(C.P. 1923).
13-14. Peefer v. State, supra note 13-13. But see State v. Gans, 168 Ohio St. 174, 151
N.E.2d 709 (1958). In the Gans case the parents of the nonage bride were convicted of "act-
ing in a way tending to cause delinquency" when they encouraged her to enter into an out-
of-state marriage which was apparently valid when made. Every argument the court used to
convict the parents applied with equal force to the husband.
13-15. 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint 413 (C.P. 1891), af'd, 53 Ohio St. 685 (1895).
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of obtaining a judicial sentence for annulling such a marriage; unless the
parties have the means of escape in their own hands, none exist.'' 1 3- 16 If
this rule was ever the law, it was dearly repudiated by the same court in
the later case of Waymire v. Jetmore.13-7 Thus, it appears that the rule
of the Shafher case, which has caused so much difficulty, rests on an in-
correct assumption of law.
Section 14 - Fraud
Outside of Ohio, fraud is probably the most common ground for an-
nulment. There are very few Ohio cases on fraud, probably because the
Ohio courts are quite liberal in granting divorces for cruelty and gross
neglect. In Ohio, fraud is a ground for both annulment and divorce,
and the problems that result from this dual position are treated in Section
22 infra.
The general rules on fraud are easy to state, but extremely difficult
to apply. When men and women are courting each other, they are apt
to indulge in all sorts of exaggerations, evasions, or actual lies with re-
spect to such matters as past history, character, or future prospects. If
every misrepresentation were a ground for annulment, no marriage would
be safe from attack. A certain amount of "puffing" is allowable and in-
evitable in the courtship, just as it is in commercial transactions. Since
the real question is how much fraud is necessary to justify an annulment,
the answer will depend largely upon the facts of the particular case."
Generally, a marriage which is induced by fraud is voidable rather
than void, and cohabitation after knowledge of the fraud is treated as an
act of ratification or as a waiver of the defect, and will defeat any claim
for annulment.' 2  An action for anrulment is not the exclusive remedy
of the fraud victim; he may also bring an action for damages." -
Although the rule is seldom stated, the cases clearly indicate that if
the marriage has not been consummated, it may be annulled for such
fraud as would render an ordinary contract voidable, at least in cases
where the marriage is promptly disaffirmed before any change of status
has occurred." -  Thus, the minimum essentials for such an annulment
would be:
13-16. State v. Shafher, 20 Ohio 1, 6 (1851).
13-17. 22 Ohio St. 271 (1872).
14-1. Probably the most complete list of recent fraud cases, classified by general fact situa-
tions, may be found in 3 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 31.29-.44 (2d ed. 1945).
14-2. Fenicchia v. Fenicchia, 110 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
14-3. Heath v. Heath, 85 N.H. 419, 159 At. 418 (1932); Cohen v. Kahn, 28 N.Y.S.2d
847 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
14-4. Akrep v. Akrep, 1 N.J., 268, 63 A.2d 253 (1949).
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(1) A deception, which may be either an affirmative false repre-
sentation or concealment of a fact where the law holds that there is a
duty to speak.
(2) The deception must be intentionally or negligently made
innocent misrepresentation is not a ground for annulment.
(3) The deception must have been a material element in inducing
the party deceived to enter the marriage and must have been relied upon.
In analyzing fraud cases from other states, it is important to distin-
guish the New York cases. Since the turn of the century, the New York
courts have treated the marriage contract as any other contract. Whether
the marriage is consummated or not, the only requirements for annul-
ment are the three listed above. The test applied is that the deception
must be so material that if it had not been practiced, the victim would
not have consented to the marriage. Also, the fraud must be of such a
nature as to deceive a person of reasonable prudence. Although recent
New York cases indicate that the rule may no longer apply in New York,
this test of fraud is still referred to as the New York rule or "materiality"
test. The majority of states, including Ohio, have adopted the stricter
"essentials" test or essentialia doctrine. Under this concept, the fraud
not only must be material, but must also relate to the very essence of the
marital relation, at least in cases where the marriage has been consum-
mated. The justification for the "essentials" test is that the state has a
special interest in preservation of the marital status.
The advantage of the New York rule is that it is relatively easy to
administer. There is a very substantial body of general contract law re-
garding what is material. The "essentials" rule is difficult to apply be-
cause there is a wide area of disagreement as to what constitutes the es-
sentials of the marital relation. The principle disadvantage of the New
York rule, and a problem which has caused New York courts a great deal
of difficulty is that the relative ease of obtaining an annulment for fraud
is an invitation to perjury or collusion. In some of the cases, the fraud
appears to have been invented long after the marriage, and the action is
used as a substitute for divorce, without the provisions for continued fi-
nancial support which apply to the usual divorce case.
Some of the factors which dearly relate to the essentials of marriage
and which are generally held to justify annulment of a consummated
marriage are:
(1) A concealed intent not to engage in sex relations.' 5
(2) Concealment of sterility, or the inability to procreate."'
(3) Concealment of the fact that one spouse is afflicted with a
14-5. Miller v. Miller, 1 Ohio Dec. 354 (C.P. 1894).
14-6. Aufort v. Aufort, 9 Cal. App. 2d 310, 49 P.2d 620 (1935).
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disease which is both serious and communicable, such as tuberculosis;" 7
or a disease which would seriously interfere with the attainment of cer-
tain physical objects of marriage, namely intercourse and the birth of
healthy children. On this last basis, it is generally held that concealment
of a venereal disease is justification for annulment."
(4) Concealment of the fact that the wife is pregnant by another
man at the time of the marriage."' Where the husband engaged in
sexual relations with the wife prior to marriage, the general rule is to
deny the husband an annulment, both where the woman induced the
marriage by falsely claiming pregnancy when in fact she was not preg-
nant,14- 10 and where she claimed to be pregnant by the husband when
in fact she was pregnant by another. -""
It is generally held that the following types of fraud do not relate
to the essentials and do not justify annulment, except possibly in New
York:
(1) Concealment or misrepresentation as to pre-marital lack of
chastity. Thus, where the wife had been the mistress of another man, had
been previously divorced for her own adultery, or had given birth to an
illegitimate child, concealment of this activity does not justify annul-
ment.14-1-
2
(2) Concealment or misrepresentation of a previous marriage or
divorce. Thus, no annulment was permitted where the wife represented
herself to be a widow, although in fact she was a divorcee with a living
ex-husband, and her second husband was a Roman Catholic. 4--13  The
few cases which relax this harsh rule are generally those involving an un-
consummated marriage, an express misrepresentation as opposed to a
concealment, or a youthful or weak-willed victim of the fraud. - 14
(3) Concealment or misrepresentation of past insanity, or com-
mitment to a mental hospital. 1 5  Of course if the marriage is entered
14-7. Davis v. Davis, 90 NJ. Eq. 158, 106 AtI. 644 (Ch. 1919).
14-8. Stone v. Stone, 136 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1943); C. v. C., 157 Wis. 301, 148 N.W.
865 (1914).
14-9. Vorvilas v. Vorvilas, 252 Wis. 333, 31 N.W.2d 586 (1948). See also Annot, 13
A.L.R. 1428 (1921).
14-10. Mason v. Mason, 164 Ark. 59, 261 S.W. 40 (1924); Levy v. Levy, 309 Mass. 486,
34 N.E.2d 650 (1941).
14-11. Kawecki v. Kawecki, 67 Ohio App. 34, 35 N.E.2d 865 (1941); Foss v. Foss, 12
Allen 26 (Mass. 1866). See Annot., 13 A.L.I 1428 (1921).
14-12. Foy v. Foy, 57 Cal. App. 2d 334 (1943); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 85 A.2d 706(Del. Sup. 1951); Joy v. Joy, 12 Ohio Dec. 574 (C.P., 1900). Contra, McAndrew v. Mc-
Andrew, 194 Ky. 755, 240 S.W. 745 (1921).
14-13. Cassin v. Cassin, 264 Mass. 28, 161 N.E. 603 (1928); Oswald v. Oswald, 146 Md.
319, 126 AtI. 81 (1924). See also Annot., 58 A.L.R. 319 (1929).
14-14. Christlieb v. Christlieb, 71 Ind. App. 682, 125 N.E. 486 (1919).
14-15. Robertson v. Roth, 163 Minn. 501, 204 N.W. 329 (1925). See Annot., 39 A.L.R.
1345 (1925).
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into at a time when the spouse is insane, the lack of mental capacity will
excuse the fraud, but the marriage may be annulled for insanity under
the rules discussed in Section 12 supra.' '"
(4) Concealment or misrepresentation as to age, health, or physical
characteristics. Thus, an Ohio court denied an annulment where the
bride wore glasses to conceal a glass eye."'
(5) Concealment or misrepresentation as to past or present finan-
cial condition, social position, occupation, education, etc.' 8  Thus, an
annulment was denied where the husband represented himself as wealthy
when in fact his business was bankrupt 1. -" The strict rule denying an-
nulment is sometimes relaxed where the fraud is gross and the victim is
young and immature, or aged and feeble.'
(6) Concealment or misrepresentation as to nationality or citizen-
ship. Generally, fraud as to national origin, race, or citizenship does not
go to the essence of the marriage, 4 "1 but New York courts have held
that a false representation of American citizenship warrants annulment,
especially where the guilty husband was subject to deportation for illegal
entry.1-
22
(7) Concealment or misrepresentation of an ulterior or unworthy
motive, such as a marriage for money alone, a marriage to gain a new
citizenship or avoid deportation, or a marriage entered into for the sole
purpose of legitimatizing a child born of the parties."*23 An increasing
number of courts have recently allowed annulment where the fraud was
extreme and the victim was immature or not in a position to investigate
the truth of the representations." -24
There are four areas of fraud where the rules have not yet crystallized,
14-16. Storf v. Papalia, 46 A.2d 907 (N.J. Ch. 1946).
14-17. Kraus v. Kraus, 6 Ohio N.P. 248 (C.P. 1899).
14-18. Meyer v. Meyer, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 561 (C.P. 1878), afl'd, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint
627 (Dist. Ct. 1879).
14-19. Marshall v. Marshall, 212 Cal. 736, 300 Pac. 816 (1931). See Annot., 75 A.L.R.
663 (1931).
14-20. Entsminger v. Entsminger, 99 Kans. 362, 161 Pac. 607 (1916); Brown v. Scott, 140
Md. 258, 117 Ad. 114 (1922); Dooley v. Dooley, 93 N.J. Eq. 22, 115 Ad. 268 (Ch. 1921).
See Annot, 22 A.LR. 818 (1922).
14-21. Wetstine v. Wetstine, 114 Conn. 7, 157 Ad. 418 (1931).
14-22. Domaskinos v. Domaskinos, 325 Mass. 217, 89 NTE.2d 766 (1950) (application of
New York law); Protopapas v. Protopapas, 47 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Iaage v.
laage, 26 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Truiano v. Truiano, 201 N.Y. Supp. 573 (Sup. Ct.
1923).
14-23. Salzberg v. Salzberg, 107 NJ. Eq. 524, 153 Ad. 605 (Ct. Err. & App. 1931); Camp-
bell v. Moore, 189 S.C. 497, 1 S.E.2d 784 (1939); Harding v. Harding, 11 Wash. 2d 138,
118 P.2d 789 (1941).
14-24. Security-First Nael Bank v. Schaub, 71 Cal. App. 2d 467, 162 P.2d 966 (1945);
Titcomb v. Titcomb, 160 Fla. 320, 34 So.2d 742 (1948); Sampson v. Sampson 332 Mich.
214, 50 N.W.2d 764 (1952).
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and the few cases involved are divided on whether the fraud relates to the
essence of the marriage or not. These are:
(1) Concealment of a past history of serious criminal activity. The
Ohio courts have not discussed this problem, and the decisions from
other jurisdictions are in conflict. A California court stated as dictum
that concealment of a prior conviction for a crime involving moral turpi-
tude would justify annulment..4 -25  A New York court held that con-
cealment of a prior conviction for rape related to the essence of the
marriage,' 26 although Florida has held to the contrary."2
(2) It already has been noted that concealment of a serious illness
which is communicable or which could be inherited by children is a
ground for annulment. There are numerous illnesses which do not fall
into these categories, but which do prevent a husband from supporting
his wife. There are no cases which have determined whether the success-
ful concealment of an illness which results in permanent disability is a
ground for annulment. The issue was raised, but not decided in a recent
Connecticut case. 1" 2 8
(3) As to false promises relative to present or future religious
faith, the cases are in conflict. The problem is complicated by the con-
stitutional provisions relative to freedom of worship and separation of
church and state. Generally, breach of a pre-marital agreement to re-
nounce a religious faith, accept a new faith, or raise children in a speci-
fied faith, is not a ground for annulment.' 29  In Ohio, a common pleas
court held that breach of a pre-nuptial agreement by the wife to renounce
her religious faith could not be considered gross neglect of duty. The
court said that to allow such a ground for divorce would violate the
wife's constitutional right to freedom of religion."' -  A number of
courts have allowed an annulment for fraud where both parties were
already of the same faith, and one spouse violated an agreement to fol-
low a civil ceremony with a religious ceremony. Thus, two New Jersey
cases granted annulment where, after a civil ceremony, the husband re-
fused to be married in the Roman Catholic Church."' In one case both
14-25. Mayer v. Mayer, 207 Cal. 685, 279 Pac. 783 (1929).
14-26. Giannotti v. Giannotti, 60 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
14-27. Savini v. Savini, 58 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1952).
14-28. Nerini v. Nerini, 11 Conn. Supp. 361 (Super. Ct. 1943).
14-29. Hickman v. Hickman, 10 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). Contra, Williams v.
Williams, 86 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
14-30. Apple v. Apple, 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 620 (C.P. 1931). As to the general problem
of the relation between the constitutional doctrine of freedom of religion and domestic rela-
tions law, see Hackett v. Hackett, 150 N.E.2d 431 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958), affirming 146
N.E.2d 477 (Ohio C.P. 1957), appeal as of right denied, 168 Ohio St. 373, 154 N.E.2d 820
(1958); Note, 72 HARv. L. REV. 372 (1958); Note, 10 W. RES. L. REV. 397 (1959).
14-31. Akrep v. Akrep, 1 N.J. 268, 63 A.2d 253 (1949); Nocenti v. Ruberti, 3 A.2d 128
(N.J. Eq. 1933). See also Samuelson v. Samuelson, 155 Md. 639, 142 Adl. 97 (1928);
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parties were Catholics, and in the other the wife was Catholic and the
husband falsely represented that he was of the same religion.
(4) It has already been said that a concealed intent not to consum-
mate a marriage by refraining from sex relations or concealment of the
fact of sterility are both recognized grounds for annulment." 2 In recent
years, a number of courts have been faced with the problem of a con-
cealed intent held by one spouse at the time of the marriage not to en-
gage in sex relations unless contraceptives are used. Most of the courts
which have passed on this problem in recent years have held that such
fraud does relate to the essence." 3 Of course, the problem of proof is
a difficult one in a case of this type," -4 and the plaintiff is sometimes de-
nied relief because of acquiescence in the use of contraceptives. 1 5  In
some states an unjustified insistence on such devices has also been treated
as a ground for divorce under the heading of desertion, cruelty, or gross
neglect.
Section 15 - Duress
In general, where the consent of a party has been obtained by violence
or threats of physical harm, the victim of the coercion may have the re-
sulting marriage annulled. The threat need not be directed at the vic-
tim. Thus, threats of harm to one in whose welfare a party has a vital
interest may be duress."5- Generally, a threat of harm to reputation or
to financial condition is insufficient. In a recent Arkansas case, annul-
ment was denied where the woman threatened that if the man did not
marry her she would commit suicide and would publicly involve his
name in her death."5- The majority of courts rely on a subjective stand-
ard, and the annulment will be granted if the will of the particular plain-
tiff was overcome, even though a person of ordinary firmness would not
have relented."
Labbate v. Labbate, 69 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Brilis v. Brillis, 4 N.Y.2d. 125, 149
NE.2d 510 (1958).
14-32. See notes 14-5 and 14-6 supra.
14-33. Maslow v. Maslow, 117 Cal. App. 2d 237, 255 P.2d 65 (1953); Stegienko v. Ste-
gienko, 295 Mich. 530, 295 N.W. 252 (1940); Coppo v. Coppo, 297 N.Y. Supp. 744 (Sup.
Ct. 1937).
14-34. See Richardson v. Richardson, 103 N.Y.S.2d 219 (Supp. Ct. 1951); Witten v.
Witten, 109 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
14-35. In Maslow v. Maslow, 117 Cal. App. 237, 255 P.2d 65 (1953), acquiescence for 6
months barred the action. In Baxter v. Baxter, 117 LJ.HL., (n.s.) 479 (1948), 10 years
acquiescence was not a bar.
15-1. Warren v. Warren, 199 N.Y. Supp. 856 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Fratello v. Fratello, 193
N.Y. Supp. 865 (Sup. Ct. 1922). Contra, Capasso v. Colonna, 95 NJ. Eq. 35, 122 Ad. 378
(Ch. 1923).
15-2. Feigenbaum v. Feigenbaum, 210 Ark. 186, 194 S.W.2d 1012 (1946); accord, Fluharty
v. Fluharty, 193 Ad. 838 (Del. Super. Ct. 1937). Contra, Scott v. Sebright, 57 L.T.R.
(n.s.) 421 (P. Ct. 1886).
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To warrant annulment, the coercion must have been present through-
out the entire transaction, and if the plaintiff had a reasonable oppor-
tunity to escape, relief will be denied." -  The threats need not come
from the defendant in the annulment action, and annulment will be
granted where the coercion is exercised by friends or relations of the de-
fendant. A New York court has held that annulment will not be granted
unless the defendant was a party to the duress or was aware of it." -
This seems wrong in principle since annulment is granted to allow the
plaintiff to escape from a marriage to which he did not consent, rather
than as a punishment for misconduct of the defendant - one case
so holds."'
There are some cases where it is clear that the consent of the party
was obtained by duress; yet the demands of public policy will override
the interests of the plaintiff and the court will find that there was no
duress. Thus, where a man has had intercourse with a girl and then con-
sents to marriage to avoid prosecution for bastardy, seduction, or statu-
tory rape, annulment will not be granted unless the charge was made
without probable cause." In this situation an annulment will usually
be denied the man, but in one such Ohio case the court granted the wife
an annulment on the ground that the man, the victim of the duress, never
intended to consummate the marriage and was therefore guilty of
fraud.' - The strict rule denying annulment where the threatened prose-
cution is based on probable cause, even though the man is in fact inno-
cent, is sometimes relaxed where the man is immature and is given no
chance to consult with friends or counsel."5 9 The rule may also be over-
looked where the man is ill and believes that if convicted of nonsupport
of the illegitimate child, his term in the workhouse will kill him."' -
Although there is dictum on both sides in Ohio cases, it is generally
held that a coerced marriage is voidable rather than void, and annulment
will not be granted if the parties ratify the marriage."' - Consumma-
tion is very strong evidence of intent to ratify, but consummation under
duress will not ratify the marriage.' 2
15-3. Smith v. Smith, 47 Ohio Bull. 137 (C.P. 1902); Cannon v. Cannon, 7 Tenn. App. 19
(1928).
15-4. Phipps v. Phipps, 216 S.C. 248, 57 SE.2d 417 (1950). See Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d
1426 (1951).
15-5. Sherman v. Sherman, 20 N.Y. Supp. 414 (C.P. 1892).
15-6. Lee v. Lee, 176 Ark. 636, 3 S.W.2d 672 (1928).
15-7. Smith v. Saum, 324 Ill. App. 299, 58 N.E.2d 248 (1944). See also cases collected
in Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 1426, 1436 (1951).
15-8. Miller v. Miller, 1 Ohio Dec. 354 (C.P. 1894).
15-9. Smith v. Smith, 51 Mich. 607, 17 N.W. 76 (1883).
15-10. Smith v. Smith, 47 Ohio Bull. 137 (C.P. 1902).
15-11. Norvell v. State, 193 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1946). See also cases collected
in Annot., 91 A.LR. 414 (1934).
15-12. Fowler v. Fowler, 131 La. 1088, 60 So. 694 (1913).
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Section 16 - Mistake and Lack of Mutual Consent
A mistake as to the name, character, or past history of a party to a
marriage will ordinarily not affect the validity of a marriage, either under
the doctrine of mistake or under the doctrine of fraud. Thus, the mere
assumption of a false name by one party will not justify annulment. A
true mistake as to identity, however, as where a person is substituted for
the one who intended to marry, will render the marriage voidable. 1
A mistaken belief by one or both parties that the ceremony performed
is not a marriage, but is a religious or engagement ceremony is a suffi-
cient ground for annulment by the mistaken party." -2 In such a case,
there is no real consent, even though the forms of marriage are complied
with.
When the marriage is contracted as a joke or jest, a few courts have
denied annulment," but the weight of authority today is that such a
marriage is voidable when there is dear evidence that both parties lacked
real intent to enter a permanent marriage." The majority view has
been cited with approval in a recent Ohio case."
The most difficult problem in this area is the requirement of mutual
consent. The majority of courts hold that when both parties intend to
enter the legal status of matrimony, the marriage is valid, and a mutual
understanding that the marriage was not to be consummated and would
be annulled will be disregarded. Thus, a recent Connecticut decision held
that recognition of such an agreement would be contrary to public
policy."' In a few states, apparently including Ohio, the opposite view
is taken. Thus, in Stone v. Stone," - a young girl became pregnant. The
father was unavailable for marriage, so it was agreed that a family friend
would marry her to give a name to the child. Both parties intended that
they would never assume any relation of husband and wife, and they sep-
arated immediately after the ceremony. The court held that it was the
marriage which was contrary to public policy rather than the reservations,
and granted the annulment. In a similar Ohio case, the court granted
the annulment, stating: "A child needs help in a social order that styles
him, instead of his guilty parents, as being 'illegitimate' ... . The court
16-1. Meyer v. Meyer, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 561 (C.P. 1878), afj'd, 4 Ohio Bull. 368 (Dist.
Ct. 1879). See cases collected in Annot., 75 A.LR. 663 (1931).
16-2. Mehta v. Mehta, 2 All E. R. 690 (P. Ct 1945).
16-3. See Hand v. Berry, 170 Ga. 743, 154 S.B. 239 (Ch. 1930), and cases collected in An-
not., 14 A.L.R.2d 624 (1950).
16-4. Davis v. Davis, 119 Conn. 194, 175 Ad. 574 (1934); McClurg v. Terry, 21 N.J. Eq.
225 (Ch. 1870); Meredith v. Shakespeare, 96 W. Va. 229, 122 S.Y. 520 (1924).
16-5. Conley v. Conley, 28 Ohio Op. 289 (C.P. 1943), a!t'd by court of appeals without
opinion.
16-6. Schibi v. Schibi, 136 Conn. 196, 69 A.2d 831 (1949). See cases collected in Annot.,
14 A.L.R. 2d 624 (1950); Comment, Sham Marrages, 20 U. Cm. L REv. 710 (1953).
16-7. 159 Fla. 624, 32 So.2d 278 (1947).
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prefers not to punish either party for their honorable conduct in formu-
lating a plan that permitted the child to be born in wedlock." 1"
Section 17 - Physical Health
There are three physical conditions which might give rise to a de-
fective marriage: impotency, syphilis, and epilepsy. The annulment of a
marriage for any one of these defects should not be confused with annul-
ment for fraudulent concealment of serious illness." 7-  The distinction
is clearly illustrated by the rule that sterility or the inability to pro-
create is not a defect, but concealment of sterility is fraud which re-
lates to the essentials of the marriage and may be a ground for annul-
ment."7 -  The justification for the different treatment of the two situa-
tions lies in the presence of fault in the fraud case.
As to syphilis, Ohio Revised Code section 3101.06 provides that no
marriage license shall issue to any person with communicable syphilis.
The statute is silent as to the validity of a marriage contracted in viola-
tion of its provisions, and there are no Ohio cases indicating whether such
a marriage would be valid. The few cases from other jurisdictions hold
that where the legislature has clearly indicated that a syphilitic should
not marry, such a marriage is voidable." -
Until 1959, the same statute also applied to the marriage of an epi-
leptic, a disability which is more difficult to justify and which applies to
a much larger segment of the population. Although neither venereal
disease nor epilepsy were defects at common law or canon law, most
states today have statutory prohibitions against the marriage of epileptics,
based on the assumption that it is an inherited disease. It is now general-
ly recognized that epilepsy is not inheritable and that it can be kept under
control by drugs. Practically, the prohibition is impossible to enforce.
The result is that several states have recently repealed the marriage ban.
Where the statute does not spell out the effect of violation of the ban,
the few cases indicate that the marriage is voidable only,' 4 although one
16-8. Conley v. Conley, 28 Ohio Op. 289, 289-90 (C.P. 1943), aff'd by court of appeals
without opinion.
17-1. On occasion the courts confuse the two doctrines. Thus, in Tompkins v. Tompkins,
92 NJ. Eq. 113, 111 Atl. 599 (Ch. 1920), the court referred to impotency as a type of fraud,
in spite of the fact that the impotent husband -was apparently unaware of his condition at the
time of marriage.
17-2. See Section 14 supra.
17-3. Doe v. Doe, 165 Ad. 156 (Del. Super. Ct. 1933); Christensen v. Christensen, 144
Neb. 763, 14 N.W.2d 613 (1944). See also Note, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1311 (1930); Note.
35 YALE L.J. 640 (1926).
17-4. Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242, 61 Ad. 604 (1905); Behsman v. Behsman, 144 Minn.
95, 174 N.W. 611 (1919). A recent article on the marriage problem of the epileptic is
Fabing & Barrow, Medical Discovery as a Legal Catalyst: Modernization of Epilepsy Laws to
Reflect Medical Progress, 50 Nw. U.L. REV. 42 (1955).
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case held that the marriage was void and subject to collateral attack by
the heirs of a party to the marriage." -  It is difficult to justify such a
harsh result where the parties knew of the defect and expressly waived it.
Impotency was a canon-law disability recognized by the English ec-
clesiastical courts. The theory was that an annulment would be granted
to the nonimpotent spouse to discourage the temptation to commit adul-
tery, which would arise if the annulment were denied. As noted in Sec-
tion 10 supra, a canon-law disability requires some expression of legisla-
tive policy disapproving of such a marriage before an equity court can
grant an annulment. The policy in Ohio is found in the divorce statute,
Ohio Revised Code section 3105.01, where impotency is listed as a
ground for divorce. Apparently in Ohio, impotency is both a ground
for annulment and a ground for divorce.Y 6 The procedural problems
that arise from this dual position are treated in Section 22 infra. Al-
though there are no cases in point, it can be assumed that impotency as
a ground for divorce incorporates the substantive rules of impotency as
developed in annulment actions. In a similar situation, an Ohio court
held that when the legislature included "fraudulent contract" as a ground
for divorce without defining the term, the statute incorporated the sub-
stantive annulment law of fraud. 7
The legal definition of impotence refers to the inability of the parties
to participate in ordinary or natural and complete sexual intercourseY -
Either husband or wife may be impotent, although the correct medical
term for impotency in a woman is "true frigidity." The origin of impo-
tency is immaterial, and an annulment may be granted where the inabil-
ity is caused by venereal disease,1"9 physical deformity,"' -c ° or even psy-
chiatric factors.' Some persons are impotent as to their spouse, but
able to have intercourse with others. This condition, known as impo-
tency quod hanc, justifies a decree of annulment. 1 '
Impotency as a ground for annulment must have existed at the time
of the marriage, must have continued to the time of the trial, and must
be incurable. If the defect can be cured, but only by a dangerous or pain-
ful operation, the impotency is considered incurable and an annulment
will be granted."m ' Where the defect can be remedied by a simple surgi-
17-5. In re Cannon's Estate, 221 Wis. 322, 266 N.W. 918 (1936).
17-6. McDowell v. Sapp, 39 Ohio St. 558 (1883) (dictum).
17-7. Meyer v. Meyer, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 561 (C.P. 1878), aff'd, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint
627 (Dist. Ct. 1879).
17-8. Donati v. Church, 13 N.J. Super. 454, 80 A.2d 633 (1951).
17-9. Ryder v. Ryder, 66 Vt. 158, 28 Ad. 1029 (1894).
17-10. A. v. A., 89 Ala. 291, 7 So. 100 (1890).
17-11. Kaufman v. Kaufman, 164 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
17-12. Ibid.; S. v. S., 192 Mass. 194, 77 N.E. 1025 (1906); Tompkins v. Tompkins, 92 N.J.
Eq. 113, 111 Ad. 599 (Ch. 1920).
17-13. Anonymous, 158 N.Y. Supp. 51 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
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cal operation and the defendant refuses to submit to treatment, there is a
split of authority. The New York cases hold that failure to submit to
treatment for impotency is not a ground for annulment,' 4 while other
courts have held that impotency is nonetheless grounds for annulment as
incurable if the impotent party wilfully and without justification refuses
treatment.17- 15
Proof of impotency is difficult, especially if the defendant is a woman,
and usually expert medical or psychiatric testimony is required. Thus, in
a recent case a psychiatrist was allowed to testify as to his conclusions
relative to impotency, although the basis of his testimony depended on
what the spouses had told him.' In a few cases, American courts have
applied a presumption developed in the English courts and known as
"the rule of triennial cohabitation." Under this doctrine, proof that the
wife is potent and is still a virgin three years after marriage raises a pre-
sumption that the husband is impotent. The presumption is conclusive
in England, but a New Jersey court used it to shift the burden of going
forward with evidence." -7 In impotency cases, the courts have often as-
serted the power to order both parties to submit to a medical examina-
tion, 7-' 8 and apparently this practice applies in Ohio.""- 9 In a recent
Delaware case, the court held that the refusal of the defendant to submit
to a physical examination was evidence of his impotency."' - 9
Impotency renders a marriage voidable rather than void. Therefore,
the impotent party cannot annul the marriage,"' -21 and cohabitation after
knowledge of the defect amounts to ratification.' If the lack of ca-
pacity is known before the marriage, or if it might reasonably have been
expected because of the age of the parties, no annulment will be
granted.1
7-28
Section 18 - Incest
For religious and eugenic reasons, marriages are prohibited where the
parties are within a specified degree of relationship. The term "inces-
17-14. The New York cases are discussed in Anonymous, supra note 17-13.
17-15. Griffith v. Griffith, 162 IMI. 368, 44 N.E. 820 (1896); Mutter v. Mutter, 123 Ky.
754, 97 S.W. 393 (1906).
17-16. Kaufman v. Kaufman, 164 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
17-17. Tompkins v. Tompkins, 92 N.J. Eq. 113, 111 Ad. 599 (Ch. 1920). See also Heller
v. Heller, 116 N.J. Eq. 543, 174 Ad. 573 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934).
17-18. D. v. D., 41 Del. 263, 20 A.2d 139 (1941).
17-19. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Trester, 123 Ohio St. 383, 175 N.E. 611 (1931). As to psy-
chiatric examinations, see Kelley v. Smith & Oby Co., 129 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio C.P. 1954).
17-20. S. v. S., 42 Del. 192, 29 A.2d 325 (1942).
17-21. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 126 N.Y. Supp. 149 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
17-22. Kirschbaum v. Kirschbaum, 92 N.J. Eq. 7, 111 Ad. 697 (Ch. 1920).
17-23. Steerman v. Snow, 94 N.J. Eq. 9, 118 Ad. 696 (Ch. 1922); Hatch v. Hatch, 110
N.Y. Supp. 18 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
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tuous" is applied to such a marriage, but the rules governing incest are
not the same in domestic relations law as in the criminal law. The pro-
hibited relationship may exist by reason of consanguinity (blood rela-
tionship) or by affinity (relation by marriage). A man's relations by
affinity are the blood relations of his wife. The rules of consanguinity
apply to relatives of the half blood"s 1 and to illegitimate relations,18 -2 al-
though apparently not to relatives by adoption."'
In England, a series of statutes enacted during the reign of Henry
VIII established first cousin marriage as valid and marriage between those
closer than cousins by consanguinity or affinity as voidable." The Eng-
lish statutes are probably old enough to be considered as part of our com-
mon law, and some courts have so held. The majority of courts hold,
however, that the disability is a canon-law impediment, and that a mar-
riage between relatives is valid in the absence of statute, unless the rela-
tion is so dose as to shock the conscience, such as a marriage between
brother and sister or within the lineal line."
In Ohio, there are two statutes dealing with incest, but they are both
unclear as to whether such a marriage is void or voidable, and regarding
affinity as a defect. The marriage statute, Ohio Revised Code section
3101.01, provides that persons "not nearer of kin than second cousins"
may join in marriage. The criminal statute, Ohio Revised Code section
2905.07, provides that it is a felony for persons nearer of kin by con-
sanguinity or affinity than cousins to have intercouse together. The Ohio
courts have held that a marriage prohibited by the criminal statute is void
and subject to collateral attack after the death of both parties."' How-
ever, a first cousin marriage, which is not criminal, but falls within the
prohibition of the marriage statute, is only voidable."s 7 The Ohio courts
have not followed the strict English rule under which affinity was a per-
manent bar. The court has held that the relation by affinity ceases when
the marriage that creates the relationship ceases. Thus, a man could
marry his stepdaughter or mother-in-law after the termination of the first
marriage by death or divorce."'
A number of states recognize as valid a Jewish marriage between
18-1. Audley v. Audley, 187 N.Y. Supp. 652 (Ct. App. 1921).
18-2. State v. Lee, 196 Miss. 311, 17 So.2d 277 (1944).
18-3. Morgan v. State, 11 Ala. 289 (1847).
18-4. Statutes of 25 Hen. 8, c. 22, 28 Hen. 8, c. 7, and 32 Hen. 8, c. 38.
18-5. Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 343 (N.Y. 1820); Bowers v. Bowers, 10
Rich. Eq. 551 (S. C. 1858).
18-6. Heyse v. Michalske, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 484 (P. Ct. 1940).
18-7. Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 168 Ohio St. 357, 155 N.E.2d 206 (1958); Walker v.
Walker, 84 N.E.2d 258 (Ohio C.P. 1948). See Note, 18 U. CINc L. REV. 549 (1949).
18-8. State v. Brown, 47 Ohio St. 102, 23 N.E. 747 (1890) (dictum); Noble v. State, 22
Ohio St. 541 (1872). The Ohio cases are discussed in Back v. Back, 148 Iowa 223, 125
N.W. 1009 (1910).
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uncle and niece where it is permitted by the church. The majority rule
is that such a marriage, if valid where contracted, is valid everywhere."'
The Ohio Supreme Court has held to the contrary, at least where the mar-
riage contravenes the criminal statute.' An out-of-state marriage be-
tween first cousins which was valid where made would be valid in Ohio
since the criminal policy of the state would not be violated. s"'
Section 19 - Miscegenation
Thirty states, generally in the South and West, prohibit marriages
between Caucasians and Negroes or between Caucasians and Asiatics.
Although the United States Supreme Court has never passed on the con-
stitutionality of such a prohibition, most states have upheld their validity.
A California court stands alone in its recent decision that such a statute
violates the fourteenth amendment. 9- There is no miscegenation statute
in Ohio, and a common-law inter-racial marriage has been expressly up-
held.1"2
Section 20 - Bigamy
In Ohio, bigamy is both a ground for annulment and a ground for
divorce. The procedural problems which result from this dual position
are treated in Section 22 infra.
The Ohio marriage statute expressly states that persons not having a
husband or wife living may be joined in marriage.2"-  The cases make
it dear that Ohio has adopted the general rule that a prior undissolved
marriage is a complete bar and renders the second marriage void. The
rule applies with equal force where the first marriage was a common-
law union." -
The second marriage is treated as a nullity, and neither the marital
status nor the usual incidents of the status can arise from it. Thus, the
second wife is not entitled to dower or support,"' - and the innocence or
good faith of one or both of the spouses is immaterial. 2" Further, the
lack of good faith on the part of one of the spouses will not bar his an-
18-9. In re May's Estate, 305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953). See note, 15 OHIO ST. L.J.
220 (1954).
18-10. State v. Brown, 47 Ohio St. 102, 23 N.E. 747 (1890).
18-11. Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 168 Ohio St. 357, 155 N.E.2d 206 (1958).
19-1. Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
19-2. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 30 Ohio App. 336, 164 N.E. 790 (1928).
20-1. OHIo REV. CODE § 3101.01.
20-2. In re Zemmick, 32 Ohio Op. 504 (P. Ct. 1945), af'd, 76 N.E,2d 902 (Ohio Ct. App.
1946).
20-3. Smith v. Smith, 5 Ohio St. 32 (1855).
20-4. Williams v. Williams, 90 Ohio App. 369, 106 N.E.2d 655 (1951).
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nulment action on the ground of estoppel or unclean hands.2"5 Since the
second marriage is void rather than voidable, the spouses need not seek
a divorce or annulment, but can terminate the pretended relationship by
simple separation. Thus, the innocent spouse can enter into a valid mar-
riage with another without waiting for the dissolution of the bigamous
marriage. 2"
Since a bigamous marriage is void rather than voidable, it is obvious
that there can be no ratification by continued cohabitation after the dis-
solution of the first marriage. However, in Ohio and other states which
recognize common-law marriages, the practical effect of continued cohabi-
tation after dissolution of the first marriage may be similar to ratification.
Of course, if a new agreement made after the first marriage is dissolved
can be proved, a new and valid common-law marriage will be recognized.
If there is no evidence of a new agreement other than continued cohabi-
tation, the court may still presume that a new common-law marriage de-
veloped when the impediment was removed.2
7
Section 21 - Choice of Laws
The authorities and the few cases are agreed that among the states,
the state of the domicile has the greatest interest in the marital status of
its citizens. Accordingly, where the validity of a marriage is questioned
in a state which is neither the domicile nor the place where the marriage
took place, the forum should look to the law of the state of domicile, in-
cluding its law of conflicts.21 1
20-5. Smith v. Smith, 72 Ohio App. 203, 50 N.E.2d 889 (1943).
20-6. Williams v. Williams, 90 Ohio App. 369, 106 NXE.2d 655 (1951).
20-7. Where there is evidence that the parties have entered into a bigamous common-law
or ceremonial marriage, at a time when one or both are ineligible to marry because of another
existing marriage, and the parties continue to live together after the impediment is removed
(i.e., by death or divorce of the other spouse), the cases can be divided into three general
categories:
(a) Where both parties were aware of the impediment, the courts apply the presump-
tion that a relationship meretricious in origin is presumed to continue as such, so that no new
agreement of common-law marriage will be presumed.
(b) Where both parties were not aware of the impediment, the courts presume that a
new agreement for a common-law marriage was entered into when the impediment was re-
moved (or more accurately, that the original agreement was a continuing one).
(c) Where one party, but not both, was aware of the impediment, the courts are split.
However, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that in this situation the continued cohabitation
is equivalent to a new agreement. Johnson v. Wolford, 117 Ohio St. 136, 157 N.E. 385
(1927). See Ryan v. Ryan, 84 Ohio App. 139, 86 N.E.2d 44 (1948); Hale v. Graham, 85
Ohio App. 447, 86 N.E.2d 330 (1948); Mfieritz v. Insurance Co., 8 Ohio N.P. 422 (C.P.
1901). See also Notes in 12 CORNELL L.Q. 513 (1927); 2 CORNELL LQ. 117 (1917);
6 McH. L REv. 247 (1908); 6 U. Prrr. L. REv. 104 (1940); 13 VA. L. REV. 579 (1927);
26 YALE UJ. 145 (1916).
21-1. Hall v. Industrial Comm'n, 165 Wis. 364, 162 N.W. 312 (1917); RESTATMENT,
CoNFLicTs OF LAWS § 121, comment d (1934); GOODRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (3d
ed. 1949). There are no cases on how this rule would operate if the husband and wife are
separated and are domiciled in different states which have conflicting conflicts rules. Illogical
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For example, husband and wife are first cousins and domiciled in
Wisconsin where first cousin marriage is void. Intending to return to
Wisconsin, they are married in New York where such a marriage is valid.
Later, while still domiciled in Wisconsin, the husband dies owning real
property in Ohio. The wife's attempt to enforce dower rights in the
Ohio court is resisted by the husband's heirs on the ground that the mar-
riage is void. The Ohio court should hold that the marriage is void. The
fact that Ohio law holds such a marriage void or voidable, and the Ohio
conflicts rule that a marriage which is valid where made is valid every-
where should have no bearing on this result. The marriage would be
void because Ohio courts should look to Wisconsin, the state of domicile,
and in particular to its conflicts rules. Wisconsin's rules are not the nor-
mal conflicts rules, but provide by statute that a marriage of Wisconsin
residents is void if they are married outside of the state to evade local
requirements.21-2
As indicated above, the basic common-law conflicts rule followed in
Ohio is that a marriage which is valid where made is valid everywhere,
and a marriage which is defective where made is equally defective else-
where. 1' The basic rule is applied even though the parties are married
outside of Ohio for the sole purpose of evading the Ohio requirements
and intend to resume their Ohio domicile after the marriage."' -
The basic rule is subject to three well-established exceptions, two of
which are recognized in Ohio:
(1) The state of the domicile will not recognize a polygamous mar-
riage, even though valid where made.
(2) The state of the domicile will not recognize a marriage be-
tween persons so closely related that the marriage is contrary to a strong
public policy. Some states have held that first-cousin marriages, although
valid where contracted, will not be recognized. However, a recent Ohio
case holds that a first-cousin marriage which was valid where made is
valid in Ohio.2" 5  Presumably, Ohio would not validate a marriage of
persons closer than first cousins.
(3) The southern states generally hold that an interracial marriage
is so violently opposed to public policy that such a marriage is void, even
though valid where contracted.
A recent Ohio Supreme Court decision seems out of line with the
basic conflicts rule as applied to nonage marriages. In State v. Gans,
21-6
as it may seem, the only expedient answer would be to refer to the conflicts law of the state
of last matrimonial domicile. But see GOODRICH, op. cit. supra § 118 for a contrary view.
21-2. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 245.04 (1957).
21-3. Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 168 Ohio St. 357, 155 N.E.2d 206 (1958). In re Estate of
Maynard, 117 Ohio App. 315 (1962).
21-4. Peefer v. State, 42 Ohio App. 276, 182 N.E. 117 (1931).
21-5. Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 168 Ohio St. 357, 155 N.E.2d 206 (1958).
21-6. Ibid.
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the parents took their 11-year-old daughter from Ohio to West Virginia,
where she lied about her age, was married, and returned to Ohio to live,
all with the knowledge and consent of her parents. The bride, groom,
and parents were at all times domiciled in Ohio. The parents were con-
victed of "acting in a way tending to cause delinquency in such child" and
the conviction was affirmed. Without commenting on the merits of the
criminal aspect of the case, it seems dear that the decision indirectly
changes the accepted law on nonage marriages. A court of appeals had
held that where a nonage marriage was valid where made, the husband
could not be convicted of contributing to the juvenile delinquency of his
15-year-old wife.21 7  In the Gans case, the supreme court expressly de-
clined to pass on the validity of the marriage, although the dissenting
opinion pointed out that under West Virginia law it was valid. The in-
teresting thing about the opinion is that every argument the court uses
to convict the parents of tending to cause delinquency applies with equal
force to the husband. If this analysis is correct, we have the anomolous
situation where the marriage is valid in Ohio, except that the husband
can be jailed for entering into a valid marriage.
Although the Ohio courts have not ruled on the following situations,
presumably they would be decided in accord with the weight of authority.
(1) The basic rule is that a marriage, invalid where contracted, is
invalid in the forum. What does "invalid" mean? Clearly it includes
both void and voidable marriages, but should the effect of the defect as
to void or voidable be governed by the law of the domicile or the law
of the state where the marriage occurred?21  Assume that a particular
defect, such as fraud, renders a marriage void in Iowa and voidable in
Ohio. Should an Ohio court allow a collateral attack on an Iowa mar-
riage where the issue is raised in Ohio? Both Goodrich21- and the Re-
statement of Conflicts are silent on this point, but the sparse authority in-
dicates that the state of domicile, which is usually the forum, should apply
its own rules to determine the incidents of a marital defect. Thus, a
Texas court validated a marriage which was voidable only in the state
where contracted.2 1 °
(2) A substantial number of states attempt to prohibit hasty re-
marriage after divorce. About one-third of the states prohibit both
parties from remarrying within a certain time, usually one year. Other
states restrict or prohibit the remarriage of the guilty party. Ohio has
no such restriction. A dear majority of states have held that such a pro-
hibition is penal in character, has no extra-territorial effect, and a mar-
21-7. Peefer v. State, 42 Ohio App. 276, 182 N.E. 117 (1931).
21-8. Regarding the difference between "void" and "voidable" as applied to marital defects,
see Section 11 sapra.
21-9. GOODICI, op. cit. supra note 21-1.
21-10. Portwood v. Portwood, 109 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
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riage contracted in violation of the restriction outside the state of divorce,
will be recognized, even by the state of divorce. 21 . An increasing num-
ber of states phrase the restriction in terms of a conditional or interlocu-
tory decree, so that the divorce becomes final only when the period of
time has run. It is generally agreed that an out-of-state marriage entered
into before the final decree is issued is void and bigamous, not only in
the state of domicile, but wherever the question is raised.21-.
Section 22 - Choice of Remedies - Divorce or Annulment
Conceptually, a decree of divorce is a decree which terminates a mari-
tal status because of some cause or event which arose after the status was
entered. On the other hand, an annulment decree is one which either
terminates the status (in the case of a voidable marriage) or which de-
clares that there never was a marital status (in the case of a void mar-
riage); but in both cases the basis of the action is some event or condi-
tion which existed at the time the alleged marriage was contracted. Ac-
cordingly, most states hold that the two actions are mutually exclusive.
That is, there can be no annulment of a legally valid marriage. Con-
versely, there can be no divorce where the marriage is defective, or as it
is more commonly phrased, a valid marriage is a jurisdictional prerequi-
site to a divorce action.
The difficulty in Ohio is that the divorce statute, enacted in 1853,
includes ten grounds for divorce, three of which are clearly grounds for
annulment: impotency, fraudulent contract, and bigamy. 2"' The statute
does not explain whether these three grounds refer to events which hap-
pened at the time of the marriage or subsequently, but two of them,
bigamy and fraud, by their very nature obviously refer to entry into
the marital status. The statutory reference to impotency as a ground for
divorce could be construed as impotency which occurs after entry into the
status, but the Ohio courts have never followed this line of reasoning, al-
though it is consistent with the conceptual basis of divorce. In addition,
the three grounds are not defined in the statute, but the Ohio courts have
always incorporated the substantive law of annulment in arriving at defi-
nitions of the statutory terms.2"2
21-11. Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216 (1934).
21-12. See Oliver v. Oliver, 185 F. 2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1950), and cases cited therein.
22-1. The present statute is OHIO REV. CODE section 3105.01, which reads in part: "The
court of common pleas may grant divorces for the following causes:
(A) Either party had a husband or wife living at the time of the marriage from which
the divorce is sought... (D) Impotency... (F) Fraudulent contract .... "
22-2. See the Ohio cases on fraud, impotency, and bigamy in Sections 14, 17, and 20 supra,
and Meyer v. Meyer, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 561 (C.P. 1878), aft'd, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 627
(Dist. Ct. 1879).
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Prior to 1952, there was no speculation in Ohio opinions as to the
dual nature of these three grounds, and very little as to the reason why
the legislature distinguished three of the many grounds for annulment
and designated them as grounds for divorce. There is a passing reference
in one supreme court case, suggesting that this was done so that the good
faith victim of a bigamous marriage could terminate the marriage and
also obtain alimony." This suggestion, based upon the fault of the
defendant, could logically explain the special distinction for bigamy
and fraud, although it is difficult to see how the rationale would be
applied to impotency which does not involve fault. The suggested
rationale of the statute was strengthened by an 1869 supreme court opin-
ion, holding that the victim of a bigamous marriage, apparently without
knowledge of the defect, was entitled to alimony when she sued for di-
vorce on the grounds of bigamy.
The implication of the above suggestion is that the bigamous spouse
can get an annulment of the second marriage (because the marriage is
void, not voidable), and the other spouse has an option: she can sue for
annulment without alimony, or, if she married in good faith, unaware of
the impediment, she can sue for divorce and alimony.
Apparently the implications of this suggestion were never pursued,
and the lower courts seemed to follow the practice of granting either a
divorce or an annulment, depending on the request of the plaintiff, with-
out any distinctions based on good faith, knowledge of the impediment,
or comparative fault.
This situation changed in 1952 with the decision in Eggleston v.
Egglestone.2 - In this case, the husband married the wife at a time when
he had a prior wife living. The second wife had no knowledge of the
bigamy. The parties lived together for ten years and had two children.
The second wife discovered that her marriage was bigamous and sued for
divorce on the grounds of bigamy, cruelty, and neglect. As an alterna-
tive to divorce she asked for an annulment. The trial court held that she
was entitled to an annulment, but denied her a divorce, alimony, or child
support on the theory that no divorce can be granted for a void marriage.
The wife appealed and the Ohio Supreme Court reversed, indicating that
this is the exact situation for which the statute was intended, i.e., a divorce
plus alimony for the good faith victim of bigamy.
It seems dear that the decision in the Eggleston case was correct in
light of the facts of that case. The subsequent difficulty has been caused
by the fact that the court, as an additional or alternate ground for deci-
22-3. Smith v. Smith, 5 Ohio St. 32 (1855).
22-4. Vanvalley v. Vanvalley, 19 Ohio St. 588 (1869).
22-5. 156 Ohio St. 422, 103 N.E. 395 (1952).
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sion, added the statement that where the legislature has set forth a marital
defect as a ground for divorce, the statute provides the exclusive remedy.
The statement was also set forth in the official syllabus, and in Ohio the
syllabus is the law of the case.
The difficulty is that the statement was unnecessary to the decision
of the case, and if read literally would indicate that the courts no longer
have jurisdiction to grant annulments for bigamy, fraud, or impotency.
The difficulty is compounded by the subsequent decision of Basickas v.
Basickas,2 -6 where a divorce was granted in an incestuous marriage be-
tween uncle and niece. The court said that such a marriage was forbid-
den by statute, making the marriage a fraud upon the state. Accordingly,
a divorce for fraud was granted, and the court indicated that annulment
would not be a proper remedy under the rule of the Eggleston case. The
court neglected the judicial history which indicates that "fraud" in the
statute means fraud between the parties, and not fraud upon the state. If
the court's reasoning is carried to its logical conclusion, then all marital
defects are frauds upon the state, and if the dictum in the Eggleston case
is followed, then divorce is the exclusive remedy for all marital defects
and there is no longer any annulment jurisdiction in Ohio.
Since the Eggleston case, there have been four lower court opinions
on the problem which have arrived at conflicting results. As already
indicated, the Basickas decision follows the dictum of the Eggleston case
and indicates that divorce is the exclusive remedy for all three grounds,
regardless of the good faith of the parties or the existence of a de facto
marital relationship. Abelt v. Zeman is in accord.2 "7  In Nyhuis v.
Pierce,2" 8 the court granted an annulment, pointing out that the Eggles-
ton case could and should be limited to its facts, and that an annulment
for bigamy should be granted where the parties never lived together. In
the most recent case, an Ohio court of appeals granted an annulment for
bigamy without any discussion of the problem raised by the Eggleston
case.2"- The court also held, without any specific discussion of the ques-
tion, that the Ohio rule on choice of remedies (annulment or divorce)
would apply to a marriage which took place in Pennsylvania. This deci-
sion was in accord with the principle mentioned in the preceding section
of this article that the effect of a defect, whether void or voidable, ought
to be determined by the law of the domicile.
It would seem that this is an area which should be clarified, either
by decision or by statute by going back to the original reason for includ-
22-6. Basickas v. Basickas, 93 Ohio App. 531, 114 N.E.2d 270 (1953).
22-7. 173 N.E.2d 907 (Ohio C.P. 1961). See also subsequent opinion in 179 N.E.2d 392
(Ohio C.P. 1961).
22-8. 114 N.E.2d 75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952).
22-9. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 113 Ohio App. 275, 173 N.E.2d 393 (1960).
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ing annulment grounds in the divorce statute, i.e., the provision for a
divorce with alimony for the unwitting victim of a defective marriage.
Where the purpose of the action is to set the record straight as to the
invalidity of a bigamous marriage, or where the parties, for personal or
religious reasons, prefer annulment to divorce, there should be no objec-
tion to an annulment.
POSTSCRIPT
A bill to codify the Ohio law of annulment was pending before the
105th General Assembly. The original version of the bill was drafted
by members of the Family Law Committee of the Ohio Bar Association.
It was Substitute House Bill No. 467, which passed in the House, but did
not emerge from committee before adjournment in the Senate. The
chance of passage, however, in the next session is apparently quite good.
Some of the features of the bill are as follows:
(1) By implication, but not by express language, the new annul-
ment statute is exclusive, i.e., all annulment actions are statutory, and
historical grounds for annulment which are not in the statute are no
longer grounds for annulment.
(2) All of the grounds for annulment which were discussed in this
article are listed as statutory grounds, except that mistake, impotency, and
incest are omitted.
(3) The procedural sections of the divorce chapter will apply to
annulment actions. These include:
(a) Plaintiff must be a resident of the state for one year (appar-
ently jurisdictional).
(b) Venue is the county of marriage or the county where plain-
tiff has resided for 90 days.
(c) Temporary alimony and child support are authorized.
(d) Mandatory case worker investigation is provided if the
parties have children under age 14.
(e) Annulment may not be granted on the testimony or admis-
sions of a party unsupported by other evidence.
(4) Specific periods of limitation are established for bringing the
action.
(5) The statute does not specify whether specific defects render
the marriage void or voidable, although ratification is listed as a defense
to several grounds (nonage, insanity, fraud, and duress).
(6) Parents can have a nonage marriage annuled. This is a change
in existing law.
(7) Mental incompetency is not enough for an annulment, but a
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marriage can be annuled if one party was under an adjudication of in-
competency at the time of the marriage, apparently even if the marriage
took place during a lucid interval.
(8) The statute includes a new ground for annulment: that the
marriage was never consummated although otherwise valid.
(9) The problem of the Eggleston case is not dealt with directly.
In its original form, the bill made divorce the exclusive remedy for im-
potency; annulment was the exclusive remedy for bigamy; and the reme-
dies for fraud were divorce or annulment. In its present form, the
grounds of bigamy, fraud, and impotency are left in the divorce statute,
and bigamy and fraud are also statutory grounds for annulment. There-
fore, the initial choice as to these two grounds is with the plaintiff, and if
one spouse asks for annulment and the other counterclaims for divorce,
the court apparently has discretion as to the appropriate remedy.
(10) The statute clearly authorizes an order of child custody and
support incident to an annulment action. It is not so clear as to whether
permanent alimony is authorized, although apparently it is not.
[VoL 14:724
